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ABSTRACT
This article explores the continuing gendered racism in rape prosecutions: the
undervaluation of all rape offenses against Black women and the concomitant over-
valuation of rape crimes against White women, particularly when committed by a
Black man. In this article I review the legal and extra-legal factors that have histori-
cally evidenced the gendered racism in rape prosecutions. I also explore the
prosecutorial methods that contribute to maintaining these racial disparities.
Finally, I propose remedial actions for prosecutors, legislatures, and courts.
For most of this nation's history, raping a Black woman was simply not a crime.
First, laws prevented the prosecution of any offender for the rape of a slave woman.
At the same time, the rape of a White woman by a Black man was treated with
especial violence. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were proposed and
ratified as vehicles to ensure the equal protection of the laws. After their enactment,
although the de jure prohibition on prosecuting the rape of Black women ended, de
facto barriers to prosecution remained.
The potent rape meta-narrative of a stranger who is a Black man violently
assaulting a White woman continues to infect prosecutorial decisions. This influence
is in part the product of prosecutors relying on system outcome bias regarding
assessments of "convictability. " Such "down streaming " is the practice of consider-
ing at charging what prejudices and biases hypothetical jurors will employ when
judging whether a rape victim is credible.
In this article, I propose prosecutors adopt charging criteria and employ review
committees to end system outcome bias. In addition, legislatures should require
accurate recordkeeping regarding the race of victim and perpetrator in every rape
case from initial report through case completion. Finally, in egregious cases of overt
racial discrimination, victims should sue for their right to be protected by the laws as
guaranteed by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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INTRODUCTION
The names and faces from the front pages of our newspapers and televi-
sion screens, through media saturation, have become part of our nation's col-
lective cultural consciousness: Chandra Levy,' Laci Peterson,2 Jennifer
Wilbanks,3 and Natalee Holloway.4 Each of these women has been the focus
of massive media attention.5 The qualities that these women share are their
' See Katherine Q. Seelye, Body ofIntern Found in Park in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, May
23, 2002, at Al (describing how case effected re-election bid of Congressman Gary Condit).
2 See Jim Rutenberg, Presumed Innocence? Not on Cable TV News, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2003, at Al 6 (discussing the relative media treatment of Chandra Levy and Laci Peterson).
See also Times Topics, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/
people/p/laci-peterson/index.htmi?8qa (collecting articles about Laci Peterson).
3 See Ariel Hart, Bride-to-Be Admits Fleeing and Making Up Kidnap Story, N.Y. TIMES,
May 1, 2005, at §1, 32 (discussing case and media attention to Wilbanks' family).
I See Associated Press, Two Suspects To Be Held in Girl's Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2005,
at A24; Hannah Wolfson, Search for Teen Could Resume 2 Dive Teams Seek Return to
Aruba, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 7, 2006, at 1C.
' Add to these stories of missing women the stories of missing or murdered young White
girls like JonBenet Ramsey and Elizabeth Smart, and some prefer to call the media focus the
"Missing Pretty White Girl" effect rather than "Missing White Woman" syndrome.
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race (all were White),6 the fact that they were probably missing as the result of
a violent crime, and the consensus perception that they were all "attractive."
The media emphasis on such stories has been dubbed the "White woman
syndrome," or the "damsel in distress" factor. Although the phenomenon is in
part the product of the modem twenty-four-hour news cycle and its insatiable
craving for constant entertaining information, the focus on one class of people
- attractive White women - is much more than happenstance.
One of the most notable examples of this phenomenon is the case of
Natalee Holloway. Between May 30 and July 28, 2005, there were over 500
stories on the major twenty-four-hour news stations related to her disappear-
6 In this article, contrary to current convention, I have chosen to capitalize both "Black" and
"White" when referring to the race of a victim or offender. I agree with and accept the
rationale for capitalizing "Black":
Black is conventionally (I am told) regarded as a color rather than a racial or national designa-
tion, hence is not usually capitalized. I do not regard Black as merely a color of skin pigmenta-
tion, but as a heritage, an experience, a cultural and personal identity, the meaning of which
becomes specifically stigmatic and/or glorious and/or ordinary under specific social conditions.
It is as much socially created as, and at least in the American context no less specifically mean-
ingful or definitive than, any linguistic, tribal, or religious ethnicity, all of which are convention-
ally recognized by capitalization.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for The-
ory, 7 SIGNS J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'y 515, 516 (1982). See also Jennifer Wrig-
gins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1983). As Professor
Wriggins notes, "a parallel argument could support the capitalization of 'white . . .' Id. at
n.*. However, Professor Wriggins dismissed those arguments by claiming that "such a
usage would resonate with a long tradition of dominance by whites and is hence rejected."
Id.
The rejection of the capitalization of "White" therefore comes from an appropriate
desire not to linguistically reproduce the very power imbalance that scholars in the area of
racial justice seek to address. I have come to believe, however, that not capitalizing "White"
sends a much more linguistically troubling message. Scholarship since the creation of the
convention has explored the many ways in which being "White" and "Whiteness" have
intrinsic and specific value. See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, Whiteness: Some Critical Perspec-
tives: Forward: Whiteness as Metaprivilege, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 6 (2005)
("Whiteness is not only an identity, but the power to name and shape identities. Whiteness
not only has control of valuable resources, but has the ability to limit access to those
resources to those who reflect its own image. Whiteness not only constitutes a distinct per-
spective on events, but has the authority to generate definitive cultural narratives. And
Whiteness not only is a set of unearned privileges, but the capacity to disguise those privi-
leges behind structures of silence, obfuscation, and denial."). By not capitalizing "White,"
this article would be suggesting two theories that I do not support. First, it would suggest
that Black Americans are no longer facing a formidable historical adversary, "Whiteness."
By using the diminutive "white," authors improperly disguise a very important aspect of the
struggle for racial justice. Second, by not granting "White" the status of proper noun, it
would suggest that "white" and "whiteness" is the, standard in the universe of value and the
appropriate default perspective for all action and judgment. This use of language would re-
objectify Black persons and their experiences. By suggesting that "Black" is a different
normative - in specific and kind - than "White," language would be employed to undermine
the value of Blackness by visually reasserting its otherness. Certainly, there is power in
asserting such a place, but for the gendered race arguments presented in this article, ignoring
the specific cultural - indeed tribal - nature of being "White" would disserve the goal of
understanding the raced nature of state action inequality in rape prosecutions.
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ance in Aruba.7 Her story was followed in intricate detail: every police action
was analyzed and every aspect of her life in the United States scrutinized, pro-
viding the platform for broad commentary on our current culture. Several
major news outlets reported live from Aruba, even when there was no related
news to report.8
In contrast, consider the case of Latoyia Figueroa, an African-American
woman of Hispanic descent reported missing on July 18, 2005. 9 Her story had
all the hallmarks of a "damsel in distress" narrative: she was attractive, five
months pregnant when she disappeared, and her disappearance suggested foul
play. The police had a suspect, Stephen Poaches, Ms. Figueroa's boyfriend and
father of her child, although there was no solid evidence to connect him with
any crime. Many compared the case to that of Laci Peterson, which dominated
news reporting for two years from the time of her disappearance through the
culmination of her husband's trial for murder.'° However, Ms. Figueroa's case
was largely ignored by the same media that was happy to saturate its program-
ming with other women's cases. The only obvious distinction was the fact that
Ms. Figueroa was of African-American and Hispanic descent."
By focusing media attention on one race of the damsel in distress, the
value of White "damsels" is both reaffirmed and magnified. Likely, the media
focus is the product of both viewer demographics and the values of media
reporters, editors, advertisers, and publishers.' 2 The stories are therefore
presented to reinforce an already extant belief system. To simply identify the
existence of this overvaluation of White women and undervaluation of women
of color in popular culture and current media, however, does not explain it. In
fact, recognition of the relatively benign valuation applied by media corpora-
tions is only a second-hand way of identifying the truly pernicious attitude it
reveals: White women are more important than Black women and other
women of color. In a society in which equality is a stated goal, overvaluing
one group to the detriment of another must be considered a first-magnitude
failure.
This disparate valuation is not, sadly, an issue infecting only our current
news and entertainment culture. Such inequality of valuation remains a present
reality throughout the economic, societal, and cultural aspects of our national
community. However, in one area of our interactions - how the law is applied
I CNN reported 75 stories and MSNBC aired 103, while FOX presented 434 stories on the
disappearance in that period. Lou Dobbs Tonight (CNN television broadcast July 28, 2005).
8 See, e.g, Bill Carter, Bob Costas Says No to Hour on Aruba, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2005,
at El ("Some have deplored the emphasis on white women who go missing, while missing
women of other ethnic groups are ignored.").
I See Rick Lyman, Missing Woman's Case Spurs Discussion of News Coverage, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2005, at § 1, 16 ("national news outlets focus relentlessly on missing white
women, while giving little attention to equally compelling stories involving poorer minority
women").
10 Id.
" Id.
12 See INA HOWARD, Power Sources: On Party, Gender, Race and Class, TV News Looks
to the Most Powerful Groups, FAIR, May/ June 2002, http://www.fair.org/index.phppage=
1109 (discussing the racial disparity in media sources: 92% White, 7% Black, 0.6% Latinos,
0.6% Arab Americans, and 0.2% Asian Americans).
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to citizens - we claim to prize equality of treatment as a core and defining
principle. And, within this societal bubble of equal treatment, nowhere is
equality mandated more than in the application of criminal laws.
The people that the media collectively considers "viewers" and advertisers
consider "consumers," prosecutors consider "jurors." It is sometimes unclear
whether prosecutors and police are allocating scarce resources to a case
because the victim is White or because the media has focused on the case for
that reason.1 3 When prosecutors attempt to predict the outcome of a case by
considering how jurors will perceive defendants, witnesses, and victims based
on race or class, then the prosecutor is adopting improper and potentially
unconstitutional biases in his decisions about charges, pleas, and trials. This
practice has been called "down streaming" by some researchers, but in this
article I will refer to the practice as "system outcome bias."' 4
Much scholarship and discussion have been focused on the system out-
come bias as it affects minority defendants. 15 Where there is perceived racial
animus in prosecutions based on the race of a defendant, the entire legal system
suffers from its inability to stand as a neutral and fair arbiter of disputes and
facts. However, even if race-of-defendant disparities were ended, the overvalu-
ation of White victims in prosecutorial charging decisions would continue to
mark the criminal justice system as race-biased and therefore deeply flawed. It
is this two-pronged quality of gendered racism in prosecutions that continues to
taint the criminal justice system as a whole. 16 Until prosecutors are credibly
and demonstrably viewed as protecting each individual in the community who
is a victim of a crime both respectfully and equally, the justice system will
continue to be haunted by charges of racism in its application of power in the
community.
Race-of-victim disparities are, in many ways, even more injurious to our
notions of equal justice than race-of-defendant inequalities. The over-prosecu-
tion of minority defendants or increased sentences for minorities calls into
question the inherent biases in the criminal justice system. At the end of the
day, however, the defendants were prosecuted or more harshly sentenced after
the application of a criminal trial process from which overtly race-specific laws
have been allegedly removed. 7 These defendants were, in most cases, proved
13 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 72-74 (1997) (discussing the inter-
play between the increased police attention and the intensive media attention in the Central
Park jogger "wilding" case).
14 See Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class,
and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 LAW & Soc'v REV. 531, 535
(1997) [hereinafter, Frohman, Convictability].
15 See infra notes 241-60 and accompanying text.
16 In this article, I embrace the construction of "gendered racism" expressed by Professor
Phyllis Crocker regarding the crime of rape-murder:
I use "gendered racism" to refer to two phenomena of racial and sexual exploitation. First, the
devaluation of the crime of [rape] by white men of African American women and second, the
heightened valuation of the crime of [rape] of white women particularly when committed by an
African-American man.
Phyllis L. Crocker, Is the Death Penalty Good for Women?, 4 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 917, 919
n.11 (2000-2001).
17 See infra notes 112-36 and accompanying text.
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guilty of a facially race-neutral crime through a process in which every relevant
defense could be presented to court or jury.' 8
This same opportunity to argue about the exercise of racially discrimina-
tory discretion in a given case is not available in the same way to minority
victims. In cases in which minority victims are undervalued, the inequality
happens stealthily; generally, it is the product of unreviewable decisions made
by investigators and prosecutors. The near-unfettered discretion afforded to
prosecutors may be an important aspect of the public nature of the criminal law
system. Sadly, it is also a license to discriminate, wittingly or not, without the
need to answer to the courts or the public. This ability of state actors to effec-
tively hide racially disparate prosecution patterns is particularly troublesome in
cases of rape.19
For most of our nation's history, it was not a crime to rape a Black
woman.2 ° In the few places where the rape of a Black woman was technically
criminalized, rules of procedure prevented Black women from testifying about
their victimization.2 1 And in the very few places where the law did not bar
18 There certainly are recent examples of exceptions to this general patina of legal equality.
See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 US 322, 347 (2003) (in juror exclusion based on race, "[e]ven
if we presume at this stage that the prosecutors in Miller-El's case were not part of this
culture of discrimination, the evidence suggests they were likely not ignorant of it").
'9 See Wriggins, supra note 6, at 104 n.l. In this article, I will use the term "rape" as
articulated by Professor Wriggins:
"[R]ape" . . . refers not to the legal definition of rape or sexual assault, but rather to "any
attempted or completed sexual act that is forced on an individual against his or her will."
Bowker, Rape and Other Sexual Assaults, WOMEN AND CRIME IN AMERICA 180, 180 (L. Bowker
ed. 1981). The term thus includes a wide range of situations, from a stranger assaulting a woman
in a dark alley to a husband forcing sex on his wife, regardless of whether penetration is involved
or the act is illegal. Id.
20 Although still a shocking realization, it is not a novel observation. See Crocker, supra
note 16, at 931 n.40 ("During the time of slavery in this country, it was not illegal to rape an
African-American woman slave.") (citing THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND
THE LAW 1619-1860 305 (1996)); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The "Law
Only as an Enemy": The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and
Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969, 1056-57 (1992). See also
DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING
OF LIBERTY 31 (1997) ("In short, for most of American history the crime of rape of a Black
woman did not exist."); Wriggins, supra note 6, at 118 ("The [pre-civil war] legal system
rendered the rape of Black women by any man, white or Black, invisible. The rape of a
Black woman was not a crime.").
Professor Crocker's work on modem rape-murder prosecutions and punishments is both
illuminating and inspirational. See Phyllis Crocker, Crossing the Line: Rape-Murder and
the Death Penalty, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 689 (2000). Her explorations of the continued
interrelationship between rape, race, and the death penalty in the United States, combined
with her honest assessments regarding those relationships and modem feminist thought are a
major impetus for my current work and'research on behalf of sexual assault victims in and
out of the criminal justice system.
21 For example, in 1849, Virginia passed a statute preventing a Black person from testifying
against a White criminal defendant. 54 VA. CODE Chap. CC § 8 (1854). See also Jos6
Felip6 Anderson, Will the Punishment Fit theVictims? The Case for Pre-Trial Disclosure,
and the Uncharted Future of Victim Impact Information in Capital Jury Sentencing, 28
RUTGERS L.J. 367, 417 (1997) (adding the 1849 Virginia Code also "made it a crime to use
'provoking language or menacing gestures' to a White person ... [and] applied to both free
Blacks and slaves").
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such rape prosecutions either explicitly or procedurally, prosecutorial discretion
to decline prosecution completed the decriminalization of raping a Black
woman.
22
While the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution ended the de jure prohibition on prosecuting the rapists of Black
women, antebellum prejudices and practices kept the prosecution of rape of a
Black woman a rare, if extant, occurrence. Although the prosecution rates for
rape of a Black woman have increased, there is still an identifiable pattern in
prosecution in which White women victims are overvalued and women of color
who are raped are undervalued. This means that Black women are less likely to
have their cases prosecuted and perpetrators of sexual assaults on Black women
will more likely escape punishment.
In Part I of this article, I explore the antebellum attitudes - both cultural
and legal - regarding the race of rapists and rape victims. In Part II, I discuss
the enactment of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and the enabling legislation Congress promoted to curb the
blatant racial inequality of prosecutions. In Part III, I discuss the continuing
application of the pre-Civil War prejudices regarding the rape of Black women.
In Part IV, I analyze recent research regarding the gendered racism of rape
prosecutions and its implications for reform; and in Part V, I consider the tradi-
tional role of unfettered discretion in prosecutorial charging decisions and sug-
gest legislative and litigation solutions to the under-prosecution of rapes against
Black women.
I. BLACK WOMEN, RAPE, AND THE LACK OF LEGAL PROTECTION BEFORE
THE CIVIL WAR
The history of rape prosecution has always been inextricably intertwined
with the history of race relations in this country. The continuing demand to
understand the interrelated aspects of the history of criminal prosecution, pun-
ishment, and race was summed up by Chief Justice Earl Warren shortly before
he died when he expressed a strong interest in the historical development of
slave laws because "of a reappraisal of [his] own thinking concerning slavery -
not only what it meant in the past but the danger of what it will still mean to the
future."23 Today, there remains a deep connection between centuries of institu-
22 Of course, the property theory of rape was not only extended to Black women, but had its
own formulation that encompassed White women - as children or as wives. Nothing in this
article is intended to diminish the history of gender discrimination and sexual violence
against White women. This article explores the specific impact of historical gendered racism
on current rape prosecution decisions with no intention of excluding other equally important
discussions of the impact of gender stereotypes on race prosecution decisions. The interde-
pendent attempt to seek justice and dignity of treatment under law for sexual assault for all
women is a critical intersecting project. As Ilene Seidman and Susan Vickers state, treat-
ment of both Black and White women's experiences of sexual assault are somewhat differ-
ent, and located in different constructs of power, but remain equally shameful. Ilene
Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty Years of Rape
Low Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467 (2005).
23 A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 391 (1978). See also Harold Norris, A Perspective
on the History of Civil Rights Law in Michigan, 1996 DETROIT C. L. REV. 567, 568 (1996)
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tionalized slavery and current racial polarization and anxiety.24 The legacy of
legalized oppression based on race can never be adequately understood and
purged from our society if we continue to act as if one race never used the rule
of law to enslave another race in this country.25 Among the most egregious
and time-transcendent form of discrimination perpetrated by the institution of
slavery was the two-pronged criminal law response to Black sexuality: non-
recognition of the crime of rape for Black women victims and severe punish-
ments, including death, for unregulated Black male interactions with White
women.
Raping a Black woman was not a crime for the majority of this Nation's
history. 26 First, the rape of a Black woman was simply not criminalized.27
And even when there was an argument that a statute was race neutral as to
victimization, prosecutorial inaction and Court holdings made clear the lack of
recourse for Black women who were raped. In fact, a White defendant could
argue that his indictment ought to be dismissed for failing to state the victim
was White.28 The most extreme example of this lack of protection, however,
was expressed in George v. State, in which the Supreme Court of Mississippi
considered whether a trial court's sentence of death for a Black male slave
raping a Black woman slave was a legal sentence. 29 The Court concluded that
a male slave could only "commit a rape upon a white woman." 3 The Court
reasoned that slaves were not protected by the common law or statutes because
they were under the legal dominion of their masters as required by their status
as property.3 '
Slavery was a complete system which was designed to create a permanent
supply of human labor while maintaining complete control over the transfer,
(noting the nexus between the brutal centuries of colonial slavery and the racial disparity and
apprehension of today).
24 The Supreme Court's judicial mandates of school integration, such as Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), spoke with great authority in attempting to rectify the
legacy of slavery. Numerous sociologists have pointed to this case's command to racially
integrate institutions as a primary reason for White people leaving inner cities. However,
other scholars claim "White flight," and the trend toward suburbanization, is "more far-
reaching and long-standing than any judicial mandate." Rachel F. Moran, Milo's Miracle,
29 CONN. L. REV. 1079, 1105 (1997). See also Reginald Leamon Robinson, White Cultural
Matrix and the Language of Nonverbal Advertising in Housing Segregation: Toward an
Aggregate Theory of Liability, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 101, 134-35 (1996).
25 This fundamental difference (the history of slavery) has made the African-American
experience in America different from any other group. The difference penetrated historical,
sociological, political, and legal aspects of life. See William J. Connolly, How Low Can You
Go? State Campaign Contribution Limits and the First Amendment, 76 B.U. L. REv. 483,
520 (1996).
26 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
27 For example, the Louisiana rape code explicitly excluded Black women as a class that
could be victimized. Judith Kelleher Schafer, The Long Arm of the Law: Slave Criminals
and the Supreme Court in Antebellum Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1247, 1256, 1265 (1985-
1986).
28 E.g., State v. Charles, 1 Fla. 298 (1847); Commonwealth v. Mann, 4 Va. 210 (1820).
29 37 Miss. 316, 1 (1859).
30 Id. at 3 ("[T]here is no act which embraces either the attempted or actual commission of a
rape by a slave on a female slave.").
31 Id. at 1. See also KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 35.
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sale, use, and regeneration of that labor supply.3 2 In order to meet these
demands of control, the legal systems of slavery had to control acts of both
Black men and women which were perceived as contrary to the aims of the
slave-based society. In the case of Black men, the tool of choice was repressive
and excessive punishments, particularly state-sanctioned executions, for even
minor crimes against the regime. For Black women, control came primarily in
the form of the slave system of female dual-usage: slave women were expected
to be both efficient laborers and efficient breeders. The legal system treated
mother and child as property which required every tool of property law to pro-
tect, which necessarily negated any suggestion that a Black woman could be
violated as an autonomous person.
These two doctrines combined to create a powerful myth of slave sexual-
ity: Black men were lascivious33 and must be kept from unrestrained sexual
intercourse and assault, while Black women were portrayed as lascivious and
therefore incapable of being raped.3 4 Because of this lascivious nature, the
myth continued; Black men could never be trusted to not attack White women,
and Black women could never be trusted to be a constant and loyal mother.35
The law, therefore, was thought to be needed to control both genders' wild
sexual instincts.
A. Controlling Slaves by Controlling Sex and Reproduction
Slavery is commonly understood as the control of all aspects of a slave's
social interactions. For a slave woman, that control extended to all aspects of
her sexuality and biology. This was primarily a product of the strict caste sys-
tem based on White race superiority required to maintain slavery. For slavery
to be countenanced as anything other than cruel and unChristian subjugation
and oppression, slavery supporters had to develop and maintain a theory of race
purity supported by the legal system.3 6 In this vein, one of the earliest laws in
32 See EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 33
(1974) (noting the hegemonic relationship amongst the races permeated throughout the cul-
ture and the laws of the time).
13 N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial
Black Man, 25 CARDozo L. REV. 1315, 1320 (2004) (analyzing construction of Black men
as sexual "beasts"); Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersection-
alilty, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 853, 860-
61 (2006) ("[T]he Bad Black Man image emanates in part from a gender-specific assumption
that heterosexual black men are a threat to the sexual security of white women.").
34 This was in part due to the requirement of virginity or virtuous nature in prosecutions of
rape. As Professor Roberts described, the attitude was not limited to prosecutors or White
men generally: "As an unidentified Southern white woman wrote in The Independent in
1904, '1 cannot imagine such a creature as a virtuous black woman.' This construct of the
licentious temptress served to justify white men's sexual abuse of Black women." ROBERTS,
supra note 20, at 11.
31 Id. at 14 ("The scapegoating of Black mothers dates back to slavery days, when mothers
were blamed for the devastating effects of bondage on their children.").
36 As stated so eloquently by Dorothy Roberts:
Only a theory rooted in nature could systematically account for the anomaly of slavery existing
in a republic founded on a radical commitment to liberty, equality, and natural rights. Whites
invented the hereditary trait of race and endowed it with the concept of racial superiority and
inferiority to resolve the contradiction between slavery and liberty.
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the American colonies was a 1662 statutory classification of the child of a
White man and a slave woman as a "slave." 37 This rule of descent, combined
with the utter lack of criminal liability, created an economic incentive for own-
ers to rape their slaves.38
To justify this practice, it was necessary to construct and embrace an
explanation for why a White man would have sex with his caste inferior.39 The
cognitive dissonance created by this reality led in large part to the creation of
the myth of the sexually insatiable Black woman. By creating the narrative of
the temptress slave, White men could absolve themselves of both their desires
and their abuse of Black women by claiming to be victims of the female slaves'
power.4 °
The second reason for controlling slave reproduction was the economic
necessity of replenishing slave stock. The nation's legal discomfiture with
slavery ironically increased the slaveholder's need to control slave women's
reproduction. The constitutional prohibition on the importation of slaves after
1808 further increased the need to regulate and control Black women's repro-
duction.41 Once the slave population was stabilized by a prohibition on impor-
tation, the value of slave procreation was enhanced. This aspect of the control
over slave reproduction hit its legal zenith with the adoption of the Constitution
of the Confederate States of America.4 2 That constitution was the first written
constitution in history to ban the importation of slaves:
Sec. 9. (I) The importation of negroes of the African race, from any foreign country
other than the slaveholding States or Territories of the United States of America, is
Id. at 9.
3' HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 23, at 252.
38 ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 22-23 ("Black procreation helped to sustain slavery, giving
slave masters an economic incentive to govern Black women's reproductive lives. Slave
women's childbearing replenished the enslaved labor force: Black women bore children
who belonged to the slaveowner from the moment of their conception."). See also Gail
Elizabeth Wyatt, The Sociocultural Context of African American and White American
Women's Rape, 48 J. Soc. ISSUES 77, 79 (1992).
'9 This was not an imaginary practice; in 1860 10% of the slave population was categorized
as "Mullato." JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN,
WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 37 (1986). See also ROBERT
WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF
AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 133 (1974) (estimating mixed-race slaves fathered by Whites
were 1-2% of slave population).
40 See ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 11.
41 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9. "The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior
to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person." Id. See also Adrienne D. Davis,
Slavery and the Roots of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
457, 459 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) ("Following the close of
the (legal) international slave trade in 1808 . . . thriving domestic trade in black people
emerged - supplied by black women's childbearing."); ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 24 ("The
ban on importing slaves after 1808 and the steady inflation in their price made enslaved
women's childbearing even more valuable.").
42 CONSTITUTION OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, (1861), reprinted in MAR-
SHALL L. DERoSA, THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTION OF 1861: AN INQUIRY INTO AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 135 (1991).
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hereby forbidden; and Congress is required to pass such laws as shall effectually
prevent the same.
43
B. Controlling Slaves through Criminal Law and Punishments
The influence of slavery and racism on criminal prosecutions and punish-
ments cannot be overemphasized.4  This control aspect was explicitly
enshrined in laws that were written to single out Black defendants for execution
for relatively petty crimes.4 5 For example, in Virginia in the 1830s, there were
five capital crimes for Whites and seventy-two capital offenses for Blacks.46 In
1848, Virginia passed a statute that required the death penalty for a Black per-
son convicted for any offense punishable by three years or more for a White.4 7
In Louisiana, Virginia, "Tennessee, and Alabama slaves and free [B]lacks
could receive the death penalty for burglary, arson, or the destruction of any
house, building, or other property, including grain, corn and any other goods or
chattel produced by [W]hites. ' 4 8 Whites convicted of the same offense might
either receive two to five years in prison or were required to pay restitution.4 9
The most dramatic changes in capital punishment statutes in America
resulted from the development of slavery and large-scale plantation economies
in the South. 50 Nowhere was the disparate treatment of Blacks and Whites
41 Id. § 9, para. 1. The enforcement power was further described in paragraph 2: "Congress
shall also have power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any State not a member of,
or Territory not belonging to, this Confederacy." Id. These provisions were reportedly a
prerequisite to Virginia joining the Confederacy. With an excess slave population at the
time, Virginia did not want foreign competition for one of its most readily marketable
commodities.
4 See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 49 (1995); Erika L. Johnson, "A Menace to Society:" The Use of Criminal
Profiles and Its Effects on Black Males, 38 How. L.J. 629, 637 (1994). In one specific
context of punishment, scholars have argued that the current administration of the death
penalty in America is closely linked to our country's history of slavery which maintains the
attachment of stigma on Black Americans as a class. See generally WILLIAM J. BOWERS,
LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982 (1984).
45 BOWERS, supra note 44, at 140.
46 DAVID A. JONES, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 543
(1981). After the state of Virginia passed the Penitentiary Act of 1838, imprisonment for
anywhere between five and twenty-one years penalized persons found guilty of second-
degree murder. Due to the fact that slaves were not subject to incarceration in the peniten-
tiary, enslaved persons could not be convicted of second-degree murder. The incapability of
the jury to convict a slave of the lesser-included felony of second-degree murder most likely
increased the probability that a slave charged with murder would receive the death penalty.
See, e.g., L. Scott Stafford, Slavery and the Arkansas Supreme Court, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 413, 464 (1996); Higginbotham & Jacobs, supra note 20, at 977.
47 JONES, supra note 46.
41 Vata Berger et al., Too Much Justice: A Legislative Response to McCleskey v. Kemp, 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 437, 441 (1989).
49 D. FLANIGAN, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1800-1868, 24-27 (1987).
10 Slavery and abolition have been linked throughout this nation's history. The original
abolitionist movement during the nation's colonial period was religiously based. This move-
ment, which was responsible for significant positive changes in the administration of the
death penalty in the country, was not surprisingly subsumed in the anti-slavery movement, as
human bondage based on race was then viewed as the greater evil facing the society. The
most public and ardent critic of the death penalty during the colonial era was Dr. Benjamin
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under the southern law more significant than in the area of capital sentencing.5'
The laws of the southern states expressly prescribed different punishments
depending on the race of the perpetrator of the crime.5 2 Racism played the
legally explicit role in determining who was executed and who was spared.
5 3
State execution was a popular and oft-used method of slave population
control.5 4
As one consequence, southern states had far more capital crimes that
reflected the value of a Black person as property.5 5 Also because of the value
of a slave, some states had to pay damages to owners whose slave was executed
for committing a capital offense.56
Perhaps in no other aspect of capital punishment was the effect of race
more obvious than in sentencing for the crime of rape.57 Severe punishments
for Black men accused of even planning to rape a White woman were widely
Rush, a Pennsylvania physician, who in 1787 called the death penalty "an absurd and un-
Christian practice," and pushed for its abolition. See ROGER E. SCHWED, ABOLITION AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE UNITED STATES' JUDICIAL, POLITICAL, AND MORAL BAROMETER
10-11 (1983). Dr. Rush's treatise on the subject was America's first reasoned argument that
the death penalty exceeded the power of the government. Largely through Dr. Rush's
efforts, Pennsylvania abolished the death penalty in 1784 for all crimes except aggravated
murder. An additional important reaction to the strong colonial abolitionist movement
occurred in Tennessee which contributed to the capital punishment reform movement by
abolishing mandatory sentence in favor of a discretionary system. These two innovations -
aggravated mens rea requirements and discretionary sentencing where hailed by abolitionists
but fell far short of the ultimate goal. See generally Thomas J. Smith Jr. & David E. Mullis,
McCleskey v. Kemp: An Equal Protection Challenge to Capital Punishment, 39 MERCER L.
REV. 675, 678 (1988). See also Stephen B. Bright, Challenging Racial Discrimination in
Capital Cases, CHAMPION, Feb. 21, 1997, at 19 (stating that capital punishment is "a direct
descendant of lynching and other forms of racial violence," and that it "remains as one of
America's most prominent vestiges of slavery and racial oppression").
51 See Berger, supra note 48, at 441.
52 Id. (revealing the Slave Codes, both in the North and South, made it criminal for slaves to
be "at large" or for more than a few slaves to gather at a single place. In addition, it was
illegal for Blacks to make loud noises, smoke, or walk down the streets with canes.).
13 Kweku Hanson, Racial Disparities and the Law of Death: The Case for a New Hard
Look at Race-Based Challenges to Capital Punishment, 10 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 298, 303
(1987-1988).
14 Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of African American
Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 11 (1995) (asserting in
Virginia between 1706 and 1784, at least 555 slaves were condemned to death, and between
1785 and 1865, Virginia executed 628 slaves).
55 BOWERS, supra note 44, at 13. Furthermore, it has been argued that because the form of
slavery in United States was unregulated by the church or the crown - unlike slavery in
Latin America - this country's experience with slavery proved to be more brutal and
dehumanizing.
56 For example, some slave owners received as much as $300 when one of their slaves was
executed. Id.
57 See, e.g., GEORGE M. STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE
SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 78 (Negro Univ. Press 1968). In mid-
nineteenth century Virginia, blatant discrepancies in punishment for rape were easy to find.
A White man convicted of raping a White woman would receive ten to twenty years impris-
onment, whereas a free Black convicted of the same offense could receive death. Higginbot-
ham & Jacobs, supra note 20, at 1059 (noting the great paranoia of the White male elite
during this time period toward the threat of Black male sexuality).
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used to restrict interactions between master and slave.58 In 1816, Georgia
required the death penalty for a Black man who raped or attempted to rape a
White woman while reducing the minimum penalty from seven to two years
and taking out the "hard labor" requirement for a White man convicted of the
same crime.59 The result was that the pre-Civil War statutory system not only
reinforced the institution of slavery but perpetuated a gendered racist narrative
that survived the war and informs our conceptions of prosecutable rape to this
day.
60
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND THE SEARCH FOR PROTECTION
The first step toward ending overt statutory disenfranchisement of Black
women victims was taken, at least in the rebellious states, on January 1, 1863
with President Abraham Lincoln's signing of the Emancipation Proclamation.6'
In that document,62 President Lincoln first granted all persons held in bondage
in the Confederate States their freedom: "[A]I1 persons held as slaves within
any state or designated part of a state, the people whereof shall then be in
rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever,
free .... 63
58 For example, a Tennessee 1858 Law and Alabama Code of 1852 both required death as
punishment for the rape of a White woman by a free Black or Black slave. Leigh Bienen,
Rape III -National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP.
170, 173 n.14 (1980). Both a Mississippi 1857 Statute and an Arkansas Code of 1838 made
death the punishment for attempted rape by a Black man. Id. Additionally, death was not
the only severe punishment as castration was also considered an appropriate punishment for
attempted rape. Id.
51 Compare GA. PENAL CODE (1816), §§ 33-34, app. 2a, n.5a, GA. ACTS (1816), No. 508, §.
I with id. at app. 2a, n.6a (exhibiting the difference between the two punishments). See,
e.g., Ursula Bentele, Race and Capital Punishment in the United States and South Africa, 19
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 235, 254 (1993); Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), 1976 WL 181482 at
50 n.72.
60 See infra Section Il. See also Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the
Intersection of Race and Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 56
(1996).
61 CARL SANDBURG, STORM OVER THE LAND: A PROFILE OF THE CIVIL WAR TAKEN
MAINLY FROM ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE WAR YEARS 153 (1942). The proclamation was
originally drafted on September 22, 1862, but President Lincoln waited to sign and release
the document until the beginning of 1863 when the war was more obviously favoring the
Union. Id. at 152-53.
62 Emancipation Proclamation, No. 17, 12 Stat. 1268 (January 1, 1863). In an ironic twist,
one of the underlying rationales for Lincoln's claim that he had the power to emancipate the
slaves was that the Confederacy considered slaves chattel and therefore were subject to con-
trol by the Union as part of the military's right to seize enemy property. SANDBURG, supra
note 61, at 21.
63 Emancipation Proclamation, No. 17, 12 Stat. 1268 (January 1, 1863). For an excellent
review of arguments for and against the legality or wisdom of the Emancipation Proclama-
tion, see G. Sidney Buchanan et al., The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1974). As noted by Professors Buchanan and
Bass, there was no mention of race in the proclamation, merely to "persons held as slaves."
In the context of the White male politicians of the time, any such distinction would be
redundant. Id. at 7. See also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1864) (speech of Sen.
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The primary purpose of the act was to disrupt the southern states' war
effort by denying them the use of slave labor to support their government. The
legal effect of the Emancipation Proclamation was to invalidate the discrimina-
tory codes in the Confederate States and territories. The proclamation did not,
however, alter the attitudes the slave codes embodied or the legal effects they
occasioned. As one observer complained: "The proclamation professes to
emancipate all slaves in places where the U.S. authorities cannot exercise any
jurisdiction nor make emancipation a reality; but it does not decree emancipa-
tion of slaves in any states or parts of states occupied by federal troops. '
As the legal response to the Emancipation Proclamation, almost all the
former slave states enacted "Black Codes" regulating the legal and constitu-
tional status of Black people. The Black Codes attempted to accomplish two
goals: (1) enumerate the legal rights essential to the status of freedom of
Blacks; and (2) provide a special criminal code for Blacks. The purpose of
antebellum slave law was race control and labor discipline.6 5 While the Black
Codes did not serve exclusively to maintain slavery qua slavery, they were
rooted in the cultural narrative of the inherent need to control Blacks through a
rigid caste system because Blacks were inherently undisciplined and therefore
inferior to Whites.6 6
Furthermore, southern Whites did not view emancipation as creating a
civil status for a freed slave so slave state legislatures drastically limited and
sought to control the incidents of free status. These included the right to buy,
sell, and own property; the right to contract valid marriages; the right to enjoy
the legally recognized parent-child relationship; the right to travel and personal
liberty; the right to sue and be sued; and the right to testify, but only in cases
involving Black parties.67
The Black Codes also recast the society of slavery by listing civil disabili-
ties and recreating the race control features of the slave codes. 68 The Black
John A.J. Creswell, describing Maryland statute that made any Black person found in the
State a slave).
64 SANDBURG, supra note 61, at 23 (comment of English Foreign Minister Earl Russell).
65 Id.
66 See, e.g., Gerhard Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup.
CT. REV. 89, 122-23 (1968) (noting that the Mississippi vagrancy laws were worded as to be
facilely used for the "reenslavement" of free Blacks); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court
1976 Term Forward: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 13 (1977) (asserting that Black Code statutes forbade African-Americans from own-
ing or conveying property, inheriting property or goods, purchasing assets, or seeking access
to the courts); Noel C. Richardson, Is There a Current Incarceration Crisis in the Black
Community? An Analysis of the Link Between Confinement, Capital, and Racism in the
United States, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 183 (1997).
67 Former U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Taney interpreted the Privileges and
Immunities Clause (Art. IV, 2) as the reason why free African-Americans could never be
citizens of the United States. Taney could not envision free Blacks ever having the status of
a full-fledged American citizen. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 409-10 (1856).
See also Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of Indepen-
dence, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 361, 381 (1993) (com-
menting on the great political and judicial debates dealing with the standing of the newly
freed slaves).
68 See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L. REV. 77, 90
(1985) (revealing that it is not astonishing that jurists and lawyers "born and reared" in the
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Codes defined racial status, forbade Blacks from pursuing certain jobs or pro-
fessions, prohibited Blacks from owning guns or other weapons, controlled the
movement of Blacks through a series of passes, required proof of residence,
prohibited the congregation of a group of Blacks, and listed a code of etiquette
of deference to Whites. The Codes forbade racial intermarriage and provided
the death penalty for Blacks who raped White women, while omitting similar
punishments for Whites who raped Blacks. They excluded Blacks from jury
duty, public office, and voting. They created racial segregation in public trans-
portation and segregated schools. Most codes authorized whipping as punish-
ments for freedmen's offenses.69
The Codes brought back the labor-discipline elements of slave law
through master-servant statutes, vagrancy and pauper provisions, apprentice-
ship regulation, and labor contract statutes - particularly those pertaining to
farm labor.7" Magistrates could hire out offenders unable to pay fines. These
statutes provided the basis for subsequent efforts to create a legal or paralegal
structure forcing Blacks to work and restricting their occupational mobility.7 '
Additionally, the Black Codes differentiated capital crimes based on
race.7" In an effort to strengthen the landowner class's hold on wealth, to expel
the threat posed by a populace of Blacks who had no property, and to arrange
for a source of inexpensive labor, southern legislatures passed "pig laws."
These statutes made the trivial theft of swine, mules, or cattle of any price a
capital offense. The legislatures established these laws in a period when those
most vulnerable to prosecution were impoverished Blacks. Once again, the
confederacy's slave culture of the mid to late nineteenth century manipulated the law to
protect that culture); Tessa M. Gorman, Back on the Chain Gang: Why the Eighth Amend-
ment and the History of Slavery Proscribe the Resurgence of Chain Gangs, 85 CALIF. L.
REV. 441, 447-48 (1997) (remarking that "slave codes of the ante-bellum period were the
basis of the Black codes of 1865-66 and later were resurrected as the segregation statutes of
the period after 1877").
69 See, e.g., IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBEL-
LUM SOUTH 316-40 (1974) (noting that free Blacks were often subject to whipping on top of,
or instead of fines or jail time); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 458 (1989) (commenting that lashing, tying up by the
thumbs, deception of wages, overworking, combining for the prospect of extortion, and bind-
ing out of children as apprentices lacking parental consent were common in the years after
slavery).
70 See Jamie B. Raskin, Affirmative Action and Racial Reaction, 38 How. L.J. 521, 522-23
(1995) (asserting that the complex codes of labor regulation were cautiously endorsed by
state criminal justice systems that sold or rented incarcerated Blacks into farm labor, fre-
quently with their former slave-masters as supervisors).
71 See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, "Rather Than the Free":
Free Blacks in Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 42 (1991)
(noting that these laws proscribed free Blacks from performing a number of occupations,
including teaching, preaching, and ownership of a small business); Richard H. McAdams,
Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimi-
nation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1054 (1994) (adding that after Reconstruction, southern
Whites utilized segregation to counter the threat of African-American economic progress).
72 See generally Noel C. Richardson, Is There a Current Incarceration Crisis in the Black
Community? An Analysis of the Link Between Confinement, Capital, and Racism in the
United States, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 183, 208 (1997).
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criminal laws conspired to assert the economic control of Whites over all
aspects of Black freedom.
A. The Thirteenth Amendment and Slave Victimization
The Congressional response to this re-enslavement by law was the propo-
sal and enactment of a universal prohibition on the legal institution of slavery
that would become the Thirteenth Amendment:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
73
The two pithy sections of that Amendment masked a serious constitutional
fight between those who sought to preserve states' power and those who saw a
broad role for the general government after the civil war.
The primary arguments against the Thirteenth Amendment were based on
the inevitable shift of power from states to the federal government in the regu-
lation of social arrangements. The Democratic argument was summarized by
Mr. Fernando Wood, who recognized that the Constitution allowed amendment
upon ratification of three-fourths of the states, but nonetheless argued for noth-
ing less than unanimity:
[F]or those three fourths to attempt a revolution in social or religious rights by seiz-
ing upon what was never intended to be delegated by any of the parties to the com-
pact, would be a prodigy of injustice carried out under the forms of law, a wrong
more fatally so because made by the very highest authority .... The local jurisdic-
tion over slavery was one of the subjects particularly guarded and guarantied to the
States, and an amendment ratified by any number of states less than the whole,
though within the letter of the article which provides for amendments, would be
contrary to the spirit of the instrument, and so in reality an act of gross bad faith.
7 4
The second argument against adoption was the unacceptable nature of
equality suggested by the enactment. Although the end of slavery was at this
point inevitable, true emancipation through legal equality was very much in
question. One can discern the intended consequences of legislation or constitu-
tional amendment by referring to the opponents arguments and understanding.
For example, one Congressman, Elijah Ward, opposed the proposed amend-
ment because it would "amend the Constitution so that all persons shall be
equal under the law, without regard to color . . . .,7 This expressed concern
about legal equality was used by opponents to snidely suggest that the amend-
ment would create a world in which "before the law a woman would be equal
to a man .... [and a] wife would be equal to her husband and as free as her
73 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §§ 1-2.
71 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1864). See also id. at 2615-18 (comments of
Rep. Anson Herrick); id. at 2981-83 (comments of Rep. Robert Mallory).
71 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 177 (1865). This is reminiscent of Justice Brennan's
critique of the Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 US 279, 339 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Taken on its face, such a statement seems to suggest a fear of too
much justice.").
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husband before the law."'7 6 This comment and other similar statements77 indi-
cate how few protections all women had at the framing of the Thirteenth
Amendment, let alone Black women.
Those who believed that the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment was
an absolute necessity for the continuation of the Union argued first that the
Emancipation Proclamation was insufficient to the cause of abolition. 78 The
goal of the enactment was, to its proponents, nothing less than the goal of equal
protection for all people of all races.79 One Representative hopefully saw the
ultimate role of the amendment as assuring "that the rights of mankind, without
regard to color or race, are respected and protected. 8 °
To that end, the supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment saw it as a much
more general tool than one which simply ended the legal status of "slave." The
object was to create a legal structure in which all people could own, sell,
purchase, devise, and inherit property; and to create a nation where each person
could testify in court and could seek enforcement of contracts and redress for
torts. Most importantly, each person would be protected equally and would
have equal application of all laws.81 Representative Wilson, who expressed his
hope that the Thirteenth Amendment would "make the future safe for the rights
of each and every citizen ' 82 summarized the intended effect of ratification:
[T]he slavery which the Thirteenth Amendment would abolish [is] the involuntary
personal servitude of the bondman; the denial to the blacks, bond and free, of their
natural rights through the failure of the government to protect them and to protect
them equally; the denial to the whites of their natural and constitutional rights
through a similar failure of government.
8 3
Wilson's focus on the failure of government to protect citizens against
crimes of "kidnapping, imprisoning, mobbing, and murdering"8 4 indicated just
how much the failure of prosecutors to address the rights of victims of violent
crimes played in the Congressional understanding of racial injustice.
76 CONG. GLOBE, 1st Sess. 1488 (1864) (Comments of Senator Howard). This argument is
reminiscent of the inclusion by opponents of the word "sex" as a poison pill in the civil
fights act of 1964.
17 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 242 (1865) (Comments of Mr. Cox: "[Will
this amendment] change the relation of parent and child, guardian and ward, husband and
wife, the laws of inheritance, the laws of legitimacy?").
78 Id. at 174-75.
71 See Buchanan et al., supra note 63, at 9-10 (examining the natural rights arguments put
forward by the Thirteenth Amendment proponents). Under the natural rights view, enact-
ment of the amendment would restore the natural rights of all people. Congressmen of this
view argued that the original slavery compromise was an inevitable tension with the consti-
tutional foundation as expressed in the preamble. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist
Sess. 1202-03 (1864) (comments of Rep. Wilson). See also id. at 1479-83, 2988-90 (com-
ments of Rep. Ingersoll). See also JEROME HUYLER, LOCKE IN AMERICA: THE MORAL PHI-
LOSOPHY OF THE FOUNDING ERA, 209-12, 246-50 (1995); Tania Tetlow, The Founders and
Slavery: A Crisis of Conscience, 3 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 11 (2001) (quoting Thomas
Jefferson's original anti-slavery draft of the Declaration of Independence).
80 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2989 (1864).
81 See Buchanan et al., supra note 63, at 10-11.
82 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1203 (1864).
83 Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 39
CALIF. L. REV. 171, 180 (1951).
84 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1865).
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To give substance to the promise of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress
began work on enabling and enforcement legislation at the opening of its 39th
Session. Although many versions of enforcement legislation were proposed,85
the primary bill urged in Congress was the proposal which originated in the
Senate Judiciary Comniuttee, chaired by Lyman Trumbull, Republican Senator
from Connecticut. 86 The chief concern of the majority in Congress was that the
newly freed slaves would now be treated equally under the laws of the several
states and territories. Senator Trumbull's proposal adopted the concerns and
goals of many of the proposals and eventually became the Civil Rights Act of
1866.87
The second enforcement legislation was included in amendments to the
Freedmen's Bureau Act that became law three months after the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.88 The original Freedmen's Bureau Act was passed in 1864, soon
after the end of hostilities, to support the enforcement of the Emancipation
Proclamation and to ease the transition from slavery to a free populace in the
southern and border states.89 As the leader of the Radical House Republicans,
Thaddeus Stevens argued:
We have turned, or are about to turn, loose four million slaves without a hut to shelter
them or a cent in their pockets. The infernal laws of slavery have prevented them
from acquiring an education, understanding the commonest laws of contract, or of
managing the ordinary business of life. This Congress is bound to provide for them
until they can take care of themselves.
9 0
Both the Civil Rights Act and the amendments to the Freedmen's Bureau
Act sought to create an equality of rights between all races, and therefore did
not specifically single out Blacks or ex-slaves as the recipients of particular
legal preference. 91 In each act (§1 of the Civil Rights bill and §14 of the Freed-
men's Bureau bill) Congress mandated a similar set of rights to be guaranteed
to all citizens. As enacted in the Civil Rights Act:
[C]itizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slav-
ery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
85 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1865) (Rep. Farnsworth's bill protect-
ing Black soldiers seeking to grant them "full protection in the enjoyment of their inalienable
rights"); id. at 39 (Sen. Wilson sponsored a bill to amend the Freedmen's Bureau Act of
1864 which would invalidate all laws that created or maintained any inequality between
races or previous condition of slavery); id. at 91-95 (Sen. Sumner introduced two bills which
would declare all persons equal before the law and designate the federal courts as possessing
exclusive jurisdiction over actions in which a Black was a party).
86 Buchanan et al., supra note 63, at 15 (quoting Sen. Trumbull as aiming to "abolish slav-
ery, not only in name but in fact ..... citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43
(1865)).
87 Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27-30 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1982 (2006)).
88 Freedmen's Bureau Act, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173-77 (1866).
89 See generally W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, The Freedmen's Bureau, 87 ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 354, 354-65 (1901).
90 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1865).
91 As President Andrew Johnson wrote to Congress in March of 1866 regarding the Civil
Rights Act, "This provision comprehends the Chinese of the Pacific States, Indians subject
to taxation, the people called gypsies, as well as the entire race designated as blacks, people
of color, negroes, mulattoes and persons of African blood." JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COM-
PILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, Vol. 8, at 3603 (1897).
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have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in
the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evi-
dence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,
and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person
and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom to the contrary notwithstanding.
92
Both Acts included specific requirements that each person receive the full
protection of laws related to personal security - in other words, equal applica-
tion and access of criminal laws and their prosecution.93 Although the criminal
law discrimination in the Black Codes was one target of these Acts, many also
understood that equality was also threatened by customary practice, prejudice
and a failure to act. For example, Senator William Lawrence of Ohio argued
that there were "two ways in which a State may undertake to deprive citizens of
these absolute, inherent, and inalienable rights: either by prohibitory laws, or
by a failure to protect any one of them."94 For the proponents of these expres-
sions of equal protection, the very quality of natural law-based citizenship
required government action to protect each person equally in the pursuit of their
inalienable rights.95
Both the Civil Rights Act and the Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866 passed
after original veto attempts by President Johnson.96 The opposition to this
enforcement regulation in the Executive branch and in Congress, as well as the
continued resistance in the states, convinced many that Congressional enact-
ment alone would not be sufficient to secure equal protection of the laws. In
this way, these acts stood between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
- straddling the grand aspirations of the former and the need for the permanent
and technical legal protections offered by the latter.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment and Protecting the Freed
The Fourteenth Amendment9 7 was proposed in June of 1866 after Con-
gress passed four statutes under its Thirteenth Amendment Power and after one
92 Civil Rights Act, ch 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1982
(2006)). Interestingly, the Freedmen's Bureau Act was slightly different and included the
right to bear arms, which was a direct result of the frequent attempt to disarm Black Union
soldiers. Freedmen's Bureau Act, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 176-77 (1866).
13 The Freedmen's Bureau Act, like the Civil Rights Act, mandated the "full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceeding concerning personal liberty [and] personal security.
Freedmen's Bureau Act, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 176 (1866).
94 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866).
95 See Buchanan et al., supra note 63, at 19 ("For [Senators] Trumbull and Lawrence, the
abolition of slavery also eliminated the legal pretext for denying equal protection of the laws
to any class of citizens.").
96 The Civil Rights Act was finally passed in April, 1866, after Congress overrode by nar-
row margins President Johnson's veto. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1802 (Senate
Vote April 6, 1866); id. at 1861 (House vote April 9, 1866). The Freedmen's Bureau Act,
after two veto efforts, was finally approved by President Johnson in July of 1866. S. EXEC.
Doe. No. 29, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1866).
9' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Proposed in June of 1866, between the final enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866, the final ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not occur until July, 1868.
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of those statutes, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, was challenged in court. This
reality was not lost on the reconstruction Congress which understood that race-
of-victim and race-of-defendant discrimination was a widespread intolerable
evil. Therefore Congress, during its attempts to address the racial wrongs still
widely occasioned in the South, became aware of the specific problem of inad-
equate enforcement of the laws by White police, prosecutors, juries, and
judges.98 This unequal application of the law was especially true in criminal
cases in which Black persons were victims of White perpetrators. Signifi-
cantly, the Congress heard testimony of southern White officials' refusal to
prosecute criminal cases in which White perpetrators committed serious vio-
lence against Blacks. A number of military officers stationed in the rebellious
states testified to Congress about the lack of legal remedies for Black victims of
crime.99 For example, Lt. Col. Dexter Clapp testified: "Of the thousand cases
of murder, robbery, and maltreatment of freedmen that have come before me
... I have never yet known a single case in which the local authorities or police
or citizens made any attempt or exhibited any inclination to redress any of these
wrongs or to protect such persons.' Similarly, Major General George Custer
similarly testified: "I believe a white man has never been hung for murder in
Texas, although it is the law. Cases have occurred of white men meeting freed-
men they never saw before, and murdering them merely from this feeling of
hostility to them as a class."1 ''
This testimony, from those in the federal government charged with over-
seeing the reconstruction of the South, was available to those who ultimately
enacted the Fourteenth Amendment.1"2 Further, this testimony supported the
98 See generally REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, AT THE FIRST
SESSION THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS (Negro Universities Press 1969) (1866) [hereinafter JOINT
COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION]. The Congressional Joint Committee on Reconstruction
(also known as the Committee of Fifteen) drafted the bill that was eventually adopted as the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 92-94 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 19-21, 24-25, 41-42 (1949).
99 See generally, JOINT COMMrIrEE ON RECONSTRUCTION supra note 99, at Parts II-IV.
100 Id. part II, at 209. The failure to prosecute crimes against Whites who attacked Blacks
was a major motif of the Congressional testimony. See id. part II, at 25 (testimony of Mr.
George Tucker, Commonwealth Attorney: "[the southern people] have not any idea of pros-
ecuting white men for offences against colored people; they do not appreciate the idea."); id.
part II, at 213 (testimony of Lt. Col. J. Campbell: "There was a case reported in Pitt County
of a man named Carson who murdered a Negro. There was also a case reported to me of a
man named Cooley who murdered a Negro near Goldsborough. Neither of these men has
been tried or arrested."); id. part III, at 141 (testimony of Brevet Maj. Gen. Wagner Swayne:
"I have not known, after six months' residence at the capital of the State, a single instance of
a white man being convicted and hung or sent to the penitentiary for crime against a negro,
while many cases of crime warranting such punishment have been reported to me.").
101 JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 99, at Part IV, at 75-76.
102 The Committee of Fifteen, after hearing extensive testimony of the type excerpted
above, "ordered all evidence taken to be brought forward as rapidly as might be, to be
printed." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1368 (1865-66). In fact, members of the
House delegation to the Committee of Fifteen submitted substantial portions of the testimony
to the House as early as March 7, 1866, months before the Fourteenth Amendment was
debated in June, 1986. Id. at 1240 (remarks of Rep. Washburne). On March 13, 1866, the
House passed a resolution that "twenty-five thousand extra copies of each of the reports of
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arguments of those who sought enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to
secure equal legal redress of crimes for both Blacks and Whites."0 3
There is other evidence suggesting that Congress was focused on the prob-
lem of racially biased prosecution when drafting and enacting the Fourteenth
Amendment. For example, during the same session as debates over the Four-
teenth Amendment, Congress debated the Freedman's Bureau Act of 1866.104
As Representative Creswell stated:
I have received within the last two or three weeks letters from gentlemen of the
highest respectability in my State asserting that combinations of returned rebel
soldiers have been formed for the express purpose of persecuting, beating most cru-
elly, and in some cases actually murdering the returned colored soldiers of the
Republic. In certain sections of my State the civil law affords no remedy at all. It is
impossible there to enforce against these people so violating the law the penalties
which the law has prescribed for these offenses. 105
In short, the vast amount of information before Congress at the time of the
debate and enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment led inexorably to the con-
clusion that White authorities undervalued or disregarded Black victims of
crimes. Failure to enact the Fourteenth Amendment was considered equivalent
to re-enslavement.'0 6 Although the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment was
sufficient to end slavery and was a reasonable basis for the end of de jure
criminal discrimination, the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment pointedly
testimony taken by the joint select committee, together with the accompanying documents,
be printed without covers for the use of the House." Id. at 1368.
103 For example, Representative Bingham, a member of the Committee of Fifteen and
drafter of § 1 of the Amendment, argued to the House that a constitutional amendment was
needed in large part to eliminate the denial to certain citizens of the protection of the courts
and the deprivation of these citizens' right to procure redress of injuries through the courts.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2459. Likewise, Representative Thaddeus Stevens,
Chairman of the House delegation of the Committee of Fifteen and drafter of an earlier
version of the amendment, argued on the floor of the House that the amendment was neces-
sary to afford equal means of legal redress to Blacks and Whites. Id. at 2459.
1o See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1864).
101 Id. at 339. See also id. at 340 (remarks of Rep. Wilson: "[W]herever the Freedman's
Bureau does not reach, where its agents are not to be found, there you will find injustice and
cruelty, and whippings and scourgings and murders that darken the continent."); id. at 516-
17 (remarks of Rep. Eliot: "[T]here is not one rebel State where these freedmen could live in
safety if the arm of the Government if withheld.... In Mississippi houses have been burned
and negroes have been murdered. . . . [I]f the arm of the Government is withheld from
protecting these men, and the powers of this bureau are not continued and enlarged, much
injustice will be done to these freedmen, and there will be no one there to tell the story.").
1o6 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 631 (1866). For another example, see the remarks
of Rep. Moulton:
One object of the bill is to ameliorate the condition of the colored man and to protect him against
the rapacity and violence of his southern prosecutors .... Suppose the Federal power was
removed from the southern States to-day; suppose the Army was removed; suppose there was no
Freedman's Bureau for the purpose of protecting freedmen and white refugees there, what would
be the consequences? Why, sir, the entire body of the freedmen would be annihilated, enslaved,
or expatriated .... The testimony which will be published that has been exhibited before the
committee of fifteen will astonish the world as to ... the condition of things in the South.
Id. at 633.
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abolished the statutory assignment of different punishments for rapes commit-
ted by different races.
10 7
III. THE POST-AMENDMENT CENTURY OF RACE AND RAPE
The post-Civil War constitutional amendments sought to rebalance the
natural law rights of all citizens and create a legal world of equality. However,
in most areas, former slaves retained most of the burdens of their prior servi-
tude and wore the badges of their slavery. Black women's standing as legally
unprotected victims of rape was one of these badges. Although the laws no
longer defined crimes and punishments by race of victim and race of offender,
those with the discretionary power to wield the law - police, prosecutors and
judges - mostly acted as if nothing had changed. Therefore, the societal norms
that drove the rationalized underpinnings of slavery continued, mostly
unabated, into the post-slavery period. This resulted in the stark continuation
of the two-pronged gendered racism in criminal prosecution and punishments
for rape. 10 8 After the enactment of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, although statutes facially included victims of all races, raping a Black
woman remained a crime not worthy of prosecutor's attention or effort.' 09 The
experience for Black women was the same under either legal regimen - no
legal outlet for vindication of the most egregious violations.'10
Although the legal barriers to prosecution had changed, the attitudes about
race and sexuality had not. Black men and women were still considered sexu-
ally promiscuous in a way that allegedly endangered White women and made
rape of a Black woman legally impossible."' One of the aspects of rape law
that perpetuated this stereotype was the "force" element of the crime which
required prosecutors to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual assault
was accomplished through actual force or credible threat of force. The force
element required a prosecutor to negate "consent" even before consent was
raised as a defensive issue.112 Under this statutory scheme, the dual evils of
gendered racism played a strong part for presumably no White woman would
ever consent to sex with a Black man, which relieved the prosecution of its
burden on the element of "force." Similarly, no Black woman was presumed
virginal or chaste and was therefore presumed promiscuous. These negative
107 SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERTO MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARI-
TIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 119 (1989). See also Bentele, supra note 59, at 255 (stating
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was the reason for disparate
criminal laws being eradicated); Wriggins, supra note 6, at 106 n.18 ("A compilation of all
post-Civil War state legislation enacted prior to 1917 that mentioned race contained no rape
statutes." citing F. JOHNSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE
FREE NEGRO (1918)). The one exception to the end of overtly race-specific criminal regula-
tion legislation was the many anti-miscegenation statutes which attempted once again to
control, inter alia, the reproduction choices of Black citizens. See Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967).
108 See supra note 16.
109 See infra Section III.
"10 See Holden-Smith, supra note 60, at 56.
... ROBERTS, supra note 20.
112 Most troubling aspects of rape laws before the statutory improvements started in the
1970s.
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presumptions made it all but impossible for the prosecutor to prove the force
element.
Current statistics regarding the number and type of rape prosecutions
across the United States are thin at best.' 13 Information regarding those prac-
tices in the period prior to 1930 is almost non-existent. However, two impor-
tant facts of the first three-quarters of the twentieth century provide a complete
picture of the gendered racism and politics of race during that period. First, the
history of the practice of lynching in this country is reasonably well
documented. 114
The long anti-lynching campaign of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People and other organizations afforded a reasonable
view of the attitudes of the times from a century's remove. Second, the crime
of "rape" standing alone was a death penalty offense in many jurisdictions,
particularly in the former slave states, until 1976, when the Supreme Court held
that the death penalty was an unconstitutional punishment for rape. The
decades-long litigation in which capital rape cases were presented as prime
examples of the racist nature of the criminal justice system of the time provides
a sufficient body of research and statistics to form several conclusions and
hypotheses about current prosecution practices. We therefore have more legal
documentation of the racial disparities in rape prosecutions in the 100 years
after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment than for any other individual
crime.' 15
A. Lynching
Rape was used as a tool of oppression by those who sought to maintain
White supremacy over Blacks. First, rape or threat of rape was the public argu-
ment given for lynching Black men. In addition to acting as one of the primary
motives for lynching, rape of Black women was also a documented tool of
mobs and the Ku Klux Klan." t6
The violent act of murder by lynching can be considered one of the pri-
mary tools of race control after the enactment of the anti-slavery amendments.
For the period between 1880 and 1950, researchers have placed the number of
people lynched between 4700 and 5000.117 This means that nearly six people
were lynched every month for seventy years. Three-quarters of these people -
113 See infra Section IV.
114 See infra notes 11-126 and accompanying text.
115 There is some information available regarding armed robbery, which was in many states
a stand-alone capital offense prior to 1976. The information related to murder as a capital
offense is complicated by the fact that many states proceeded on theories of felony murder,
which is a mixed death and another crime category.
116 See ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 30:
[Wihite men also exploited Black women sexually as a means of subjugating the entire Black
community. After Emancipation, the Ku Klux Klan's terror included the rape of Black women,
as well as the more commonly cited lynching of Black men. White sexual violence attacked not
only freed Black men's masculinity by challenging their ability to protect Black women; it also
invaded freed Black women's dominion over their own bodies.
117 See Wriggins, supra note 6, at 107 (citing ARNOLD ROSE, THE NEGRO IN AMERICA 185
(1948); White, A Statement of Fact [on Lynching], in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 1910-1932 610 (Herbert Aptheker ed., 1973)).
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about 3700 - were Black." 8 The most common public reason for lynching
was that White women needed to be protected from Black rapists and attempted
rapists. 11
Hatton Summers, a Congressional Democrat from Texas, was one of many
southerners in Congress during the 1920s that supported the lynching of Black
men who were accused of raping White woman. During a 1921 Congressional
debate, Summers argued:
When a white woman is raped by a black man the call to the man is from his two
strongest, most primitive instincts .... When that call comes from the woman who
has been raped by a man of alien blood, woman, who in every age of the world has
been the faithful guardian of the purity of the race - when that call comes it is the call
of his woman and the call of his blood, and he goes. It is not an easy situation to deal
with .... He goes not alone. His neighbors, whose women live under the same
danger, go with him. The impulse is to kill, to kill as a wild beast would be killed. 20
Such was the acceptable nature of gendered racism in the discussion of
rape, that it was seen as a fitting topic for a speech on the floor of the United
States Congress. This core attitude admitted by Mr. Summers was summed up
by the anti-lynching advocate and crusader Ida B. Wells, who observed that
"[w]hite men used their ownership of the body of the white female[s] as a
terrain on which to lynch the black male." ''
Although the available statistics are incomplete, there is wide agreement
that lynchings directed primarily against Blacks in the South far outnumber the
number of executions legally imposed.' 2 2 Whites claimed that Blacks were an
uncontrollable danger to White society, making lynching a necessary tool of
controlling the Black populace. 2 3 During the twentieth century, lynching
118 Id.
119 See ROSE, supra note 117, at 185. See also ARTHUR F. RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF
LYNCHING 50 (1933) (indicating that the common wisdom was that all Blacks were "inclined
to commit certain crimes, chief of which is the rape of white women"); Ida B. Wells, Lynch-
ing Bee, in A RED RECORD, LYNCHINGS IN THE UNITED STATES (1895) (describing the racial
anger and physical torture that accompanied lynching).
120 62 CONG. REC. 799 (1921). In the same debate, Representative Percy Quin of Missis-
sippi agreed with Summers, and went on to state that the "good black people" understood
why White men lynched the Black rapist. 62 CONG. REC. 1788-89 (1921).
121 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581, 600 (1990).
122 Southerners discovered in the early- to mid-twentieth century that lynching was a messy
business that created bad press. Lynching was increasingly substituted by procedures "in
which the Southern legal system prostituted itself to the mob's demand." DAN T. CARTER,
SCOTT'SBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 115 (rev. ed. 1979). Accountable offi-
cials pleaded for would-be lynchers to "let the law take its course," thus virtually promising
that there would be an expeditious trial and the death penalty. These proceedings retained
the essential quality of mob murders, abandoning only its surface forms. Id. See also Ste-
phen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence Be Attained in the South? Overcoming History,
Elections, and Misperceptions About the Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 817,
819 (1998) (claiming that the legal system declined to discipline Whites who engaged in
violence against African-Americans at the turn of the century).
123 See Robert L. Zangrando, The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 1909-1950 3 (1980)
(asserting that lynching was used to "intimidate, degrade, and control black people through-
out the southern and border states, from Reconstruction to the mid-twentieth century"). See
also 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242 (2000) (principal federal statutes against lynching).
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decreased from a high of 130 in 1901 to 2 in 1950, and none thereafter until
1957, when there was one lynching every other year until the mid-1960s.
124
This decrease in the number of lynchings, however, was inversely proportion-
ate to the number of legal executions of Black men for the rape of White
women. Where there once was mob violence to act on White gendered racism
regarding rape, there would now be the law.
B. State Executions for Rape
A very public examination of the early twentieth century relationship
between gender, race, rape, and capital punishment law came in the infamous
"Scottsboro Boys" series of trials and appeals 125 in which nine young Black
boys were charged with the armed rape of two White girls.126 Although the
case ultimately resulted in three monumental Supreme Court rulings, 12 7 the
underlying arguments in the numerous trials played primarily on the image of
White female purity and Black male (even very young Black male) uncontrol-
lable lasciviousness.
128
These attitudes about rape were so firmly embedded in the national con-
sciousness that tangible proof of the gendered racism of rape prosecutions was
evident in the death rows across the country. Prior to 1976, execution was a
legally available punishment for the crime of rape alone. 129 The availability of
legal avenues as well as the continued male dominance of legal discourse in the
middle of the twentieth century all but assured that the first prong of the
gendered racism of rape prosecutions would be the victim/offender dyad asso-
ciated with overvaluing White victims through the prosecution of Black male
perpetrators.
124 Tuskegee Institute, Lynchings: by Year and Race, 1882-1968, available at http:/lwww
.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/lynchingyear.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
125 See, e.g., direct appeal decisions after the initial trials: Patterson v. State, 141 So. 195
(Ala. 1932); Powell v. State, 141 So. 201 (Ala. 1932); Weems v. State, 141 So. 215 (Ala.
1932).
126 See generally CARTER, supra note 122, at 11-49 (describing the intial trial of the Scott-
sboro boys). Two books were written about the event and experience by one-time defend-
ants in the case. See CLARENCE NORRIS & SYBIL D. WASHINGTON, THE LAST OF THE
ScoTrSoRo Boys (1979).
127 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 72 (1932) (the execution of Black defendants
charged with a capital crime who are young, illiterate, poor, and had no counsel "would be
little short of judicial murder ... [and is] a gross violation of the guarantee of due process of
law..."); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (Fourteenth Amendment right to partici-
pate in grand juries is a federal claim of mixed fact and law and general claims of perform-
ing duty as jury commissioner do not rebut presumption of unconstitutional exclusion of
qualified Black jurors from sitting on grand juries in Morgan County, Alabama); Patterson v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935) (same).
128 In the closing comments to the jury, the judge presiding in the second round of Patter-
son's trial after the Supreme Court reversal in Powell v. Alabama instructed the jury that
they should presume no White woman in Alabama would consent to sex with a Black. See
N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial
Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315 (2004) (analyzing the constructed sexual image of
Black men).
129 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty for rape of adult female
violates Eighth Amendment proscription of cruel and unusual punishments). See infra notes
173-202 and accompanying text.
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The focus of the majority of the early studies was on the race of the defen-
dant, not the race of the victim. Data compiled before 1930 are not totally
accurate because data on rape sentencing after a formal trial did not start until
1930.131 Professor Guy B. Johnson, a noted Black culture researcher, claimed
there were no comprehensive studies on the race of the victim in rape cases
where the defendant was Black and ultimately sentenced to death. 3 ' Much of
the studies on rape between 1930 and the Coker opinion focused on specific
cities or states and focused on Black defendants, not the race of the victims.
Professor Johnson seems to be the first researcher to advocate a change in the
way studies were conducted, by actually incorporating the races of the offend-
ers and victims. When Professor Johnson wrote his article The Negro and
Crime in 1941, the methodology for developing crime statistics focused mostly
on the race of the offender. ' 32 Professor Johnson advocated incorporating the
race of the victim in research methods to develop more accurate and complete
data.' 3 3 Johnson felt that, at least in the South, Black offenses against Black
victims were treated with "undue leniency," while Black offenses against
White victims were treated with "undue severity."'
' 34
As prescient as Johnson was, the efforts of most litigators and researchers
continued to focus on the Black defendant/White victim aspect of the rape and
race issue. Research studies from 1930 to 1950 show that rape made up 11.1%
of the total number of death sentences, second only to murder.135 The former
slave states and the federal government employed the death penalty for rape
and other sexual assaults. 13 6 The southern states that used the death penalty as
punishment for rape primarily used the death penalty against Black men.13 7 In
all other parts of the country, the only crime for which the death penalty was
frequently imposed during this time period was for a conviction of first degree
130 See Brief for NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1971) (Nos. 68-5027, 69-5030, 69-5003, 69-5031).
131 See Guy B. Johnson, The Negro and Crime, 217 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Scl.
93, 98 (1941). "It is impossible to obtain a clear-cut answer from judicial statistics at pre-
sent, for these statistics are especially weak for the southern states and they rarely present us
with the necessary data, namely, the details of dispositions by offense, race, and sex." Id.
132 Id.
133 See id. Professor Johnson hypothesized that differentials in the treatment of Black vic-
tims in southern courts existed and the data which would demonstrate different treatment
was being obscured in the south because the conventional crime statistics only took into
account the race of the offender. Furthermore, instead of two categories of offenders (Black
and White) Johnson advocated a four category scheme: (1) Black versus White, (2) White
versus White, (3) Black versus Black, and (4) White versus Black. Id.
134 Id. See, e.g., Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the
Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 119, 125 (1973) (mentioning a
Florida study from 1940 to 1964 that included the race of victim and offender). During this
time period, in six cases (or 5%) where a White male raped a White female were the accused
executed. However, of the eighty-four Black males who raped White females, forty-five (or
54%) received the death penalty. In comparison, of the eight White offenders actually prose-
cuted for raping a Black female, none was given the death penalty. Id.
"I Frank E. Hartung, Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, 284 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. ScL 8, 10 (1952). From 1930 to 1950 there were 335 people sentenced to death
for rape, second only to murder with 2645 people sentenced to death. Id.
136 See id.
137 See id.
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murder. 3 ' A study by Edward B. Reuter showed that in spite of the fact that
the population percentages of African-Americans in the North and the South
were nearly the same in the first decade of the twentieth century, Black men
accounted for 66% of the rape sentences in the South whereas Black men in the
North only accounted for 13% of the rape sentences.'
39
The legal challenges regarding whether racial disparities existed in the
application of capital punishment for rape took years to develop.140 However,
the first time that the United States Supreme Court hinted that it might be inter-
ested in a constitutional regulation of the death penalty came in a case which
questioned the legality of capital punishment for rape.' 4 '
Public attention remained focused on the problem of extra-judicial lynch-
ing in America. During the years following the Supreme Court's actions sur-
rounding the Scottsboro Boys cases, however, the legal death penalty was a
topic that "had received relatively little attention from the courts and ... was
not, at that time, an issue upon which either litigants or the press had begun to
focus.' 142 In 1963, a "highly unusual" memorandum was circulated by Justice
Goldberg to the members of the Court relating to six petitions for writ of certio-
rari in capital cases. 1"3 The memorandum urged the Court to grant certiorari in
the six cases and address the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment. 4 Although certiorari was not granted in any of
these cases, Justice Goldberg wrote a dissent from the denial of certiorari in one
of the cases, Rudolph v. Alabama.'45 The dissent was joined by Justice Doug-
las and Justice Brennan.' 4 6 The focus of Rudolph was not the abolition of the
death penalty in America, but rather the more focused issue of the constitution-
ality of the death penalty for someone convicted of rape and not murder. 147 As
can be the case with short opinions issued from the Supreme Court, the
Rudolph dissent from denial of certiorari was a signal to litigants that the con-
stitutionality of at least certain aspects of the death penalty in America was in
question. 148
138 See id.
139 See MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, CRIME AND RACE: CONCEPTIONS AND MISCONCEPTIONS 42
(1964). Interestingly, a Chicago study showed that three out of 100 Negro women are the
victims of a rape, robbery, or assault; however, the probability of a White woman being
attacked in a given year was 35 out of 100,000. Thus, the statistics suggest that Blacks are
more likely than Whites to be the victim of a serious crime which is contrary to generalized
beliefs. Id. at 42-43.
140 See William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View
from the Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313 (1986).
141 See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (dissent to the denial of certiorari).
142 Brennan, supra note 140, at 315.
143 Id. at 314.
144 Id. at 315.
145 Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889.
146 Id.
147 Id. The issue of whether the death penalty for rape was unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment was not finally addressed until Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)
(death penalty for rape of adult female violates Eighth Amendment proscription of cruel and
unusual punishments).
148 See generally Jeffrey J. Pokorak, "Death Stands Condemned:" Justice Brennan and the
Death Penalty, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 239 (1991) [hereinafter Pokorak, Brennan].
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In posing the first question upon which certiorari might have been
granted,'49 the three dissenters queried whether the execution of an individual
convicted of rape violates the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of [our] maturing society" 5° or "standards of decency more or less
universally accepted."'' Although this language was race-neutral, it was well
understood that the death penalty for rape was one of the most racially discrim-
inatory legal schemes in the nation.' 52 The use of this language not only high-
lighted the opinion that the Eighth Amendment might be another tool for
fighting racial discrimination, it also signaled that there would be a role for the
federal government in the states' management of capital punishment.
1 53
The Supreme Court evaluation of the propriety of executions for rape first
suggested in Rudolph did not begin in earnest until the 1968 term. As a
response both to the overt racism endemic in the application of the death pen-
alty for rape, and the indication that the Supreme Court was casting a watchful
eye on the practice, litigators began earnest study of the role of race in the
application of the death penalty for rape. Researchers Wolfgang and Riedel
began a multi-jurisdictional evaluation of the impact of race in capital
punishment. 154
One important part of their study, which focused on Arkansas, was
presented in litigation on behalf of William Maxwell. Mr. Maxwell was a
Black man sentenced to death in Arkansas for the rape of a White woman. 55
The Arkansas parts of the Wolfgang and Riedel research were presented in
federal court to support Maxwell's claim that his death sentence for rape was
the product of unconstitutional discrimination violating the Eighth and Four-
149 Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889-90.
150 Id. at 890 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (opinion of Warren, C.J.)).
151 Id. (quoting Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 469 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
152 Both the raced history of lynching and the specific legal constructions surrounding capi-
tal punishment for rape could not have escaped the attention of the justices as they were both
in the news and occasionally entered the Court's debates on critical issues of the day. See
Brief for The United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 7, Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (arguing that the Soviet Union was effectively using race
problems in the United States for its own propagandistic goals). The Supreme Court, how-
ever, was able to take a direct challenge to the constitutionality of the death penalty for rape
as applied in a discriminatory manner and suggest a perhaps less politically charged ques-
tion of the facial validity of the practice.
15' Rudolph, 375 U.S. 889. The structuring of the three questions that Justices Goldberg,
Douglas, and Brennan would have granted was prefaced with the general issue of "whether
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution permit the imposi-
tion of the death penalty on a convicted rapist who has neither taken nor endangered human
life." Id. Although nowhere cited in the Rudolph dissent, the Supreme Court had, only four
months earlier, first held that the Eighth Amendment's bar to cruel and unusual punishment
was applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962). Robinson struck down a statute requiring
incarceration for the status crime of narcotic addiction as inflicting a cruel and unusual pun-
ishment prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 667. The expansion of this rather
minor incursion into states' criminal justice administration to potentially include the elimina-
tion of rape as a capital offense is quite remarkable. See generally Pokorak, Brennan, supra
note 148.
151 See Wolfgang & Riedel, supra note 134.
155 Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968).
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teenth Amendments. 156 The federal appellate court, however, chose to ignore
the extensive evidence of racism because the Wolfgang and Riedel study did
not relate specifically to the facts of Mr. Maxwell's individual prosecution.' 57
The disturbing evidence of racial discrimination in capital sentencing for
rape prosecutions compelled the United States Supreme Court to grant certio-
rai in Maxwell v. Bishop.'5 8 As with Rudolph just five years before, the
Supreme Court did not address the plain underlying claim of racial discrimina-
tion, but rather considered Maxwell as a vehicle for either requiring capital
trials to be bifurcated and/or to require reviewable standards as a prerequisite to
the imposition of a sentence of death.' 59 As an indication of both the Court's
awareness of the constitutional vitality of the racial discrimination claims in
Maxwell, the same term the Court was considering whether the application of
the death penalty for armed robbery alone was unconstitutionally racially dis-
criminatory as applied.
16 1
The Maxwell case was problematic for the Court because of the potential
for dramatically changing the procedures by which people were sentenced to
death in this country by applying both Fifth Amendment 1 6' and Fourteenth
Amendment' 62 strictures to capital punishment schemes.' 63 In large part
156 Id. at 141.
157 Id. at 146-47. This proved to be a strange pre-echo of the crimped analysis of the United
States Supreme Court. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-97 (1987) (petitioner
failed to prove racial disparities relate directly to his prosecution). See also notes 265-84
and accompanying text.
158 See Brennan, supra note 140, at 316.
159 Id. The first issue presented in Maxwell was whether, in a unified death penalty trial,
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments "impermissibly penalized the accused's assertion of
his constitutional rights by forcing him to choose between remaining silent to protect his
innocence and presenting evidence to mitigate his potential punishment"; the second issue
presented by Maxwell was whether the absolute discretion allowed the jury in deciding pun-
ishment violated the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.
16 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). In Boykin, a 27-year-old Black man was
charged with five counts of common law robbery which was a capital offense. Id. at 239.
The defendant was indigent and was appointed counsel who, at arraignment three days later,
promptly had the defendant plead guilty to all pending charges. Id. After a seemingly cur-
sory proceeding, a jury sentenced Mr. Boykin to die for each of the charges. Id. at 240. The
defendant, on automatic appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court, attacked the constitutionality
of his death sentence for common law robbery under the United States Constitution's Eighth
Amendment bar of cruel and unusual punishments. Id. The Alabama Supreme Court
rejected the claim, and the defendant petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. In an opinion delivered by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court avoided the
broad constitutional challenge and reversed the case on the narrow ground that the trial court
failed to make an affirmative showing that the defendant's plea of guilty was knowingly and
intelligently entered. Id. at 242-244.
161 "No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
162 "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
163 The Court was drawn directly into a debate over the regulation and federalization of all
capital proceedings. Justice Brennan, in his 1986 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Lecture,
described the initial discussions of Maxwell:
The conference vote was eight to one to reverse the court of appeals and vacate the sentence of
death, but the discussion generated a variety of views, and it was not clear whether there were
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because of the internal debates and changes in Court personnel, the case was
scheduled for re-argument at the end of the 1969 term. 164 Ultimately, however,
the Court decided not to reach the more far-reaching questions presented,
165
but rather reversed the case in light of their previous holding' 66 in Witherspoon
v. Illinois. 
167
It would take several years and many legal changes before the questions
raised in Rudolph and Maxwell were finally addressed by the United States
Supreme Court. The legal analysis of the issue was sidelined by the successful
litigation which culminated in Furman v. Georgia and ended the death penalty
in the United States. In 1971 when Georgia filed its brief with the United
States Supreme Court in the Furman case, of the thirty-three people under sen-
tence of death in that state, ten were for rape convictions. Additionally, of the
five votes for any single rationale. Shortly thereafter, Justice Harlan, who had expressed at
conference his view that the unitary procedure was, in this context, a violation of due process,
circulated a note to all of us suggesting that he was having second thoughts and that perhaps the
case should be discussed again at conference. The second conference clarified each Justice's
position. Chief Justice Warren, Justice Douglas, and I agreed that the submission to the jury of
the question of whether to impose death without also providing the jury preexisting standards to
guide its deliberations violates due process. We also agreed, and were joined on this point by
Justices Fortas and Marshall, that a bifurcated trial is constitutionally required in a capital case;
thus, there was a Court for this position. Although not firmly committed, Justice Harlan was
inclined to be a sixth vote on this issue. Justice Stewart, who had written Witherspoon, thought
that Maxwell should be disposed of on the basis of Witherspoon. Justice White agreed. Justice
Black was alone in dissent. The Chief assigned the opinion to Justice Douglas, who soon circu-
lated a draft opinion reversing the lower court judgment on both the standards and bifurcation
issues.
Brennan, supra note 140, at 316.
164 Brennan, supra note 140, at 317. The Maxwell case was initially argued March 4, 1969
and was reargued May 4, 1970. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 262 (1970).
165 Because it was clear that there were not five votes for the "standardless sentencing"
ground for reversal, Justice Douglas rewrote his draft opinion which would have reversed the
case solely on the unified proceeding challenge. Brennan, supra note 140, at 316-17.
Because Justice Brennan had come to believe firmly in the need for reviewable standards by
which persons are condemned to die, he prepared a concurring opinion in which he argued
that "the most elementary requirement of due process is that judicial determinations concern-
ing life or liberty must be based on pre-existing standards of law and cannot be left to the
unlimited discretion of a judge or jury." Id. at 317 (quoting BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 399, 431 (1985)). But by the time these
drafts had been circulated, Chief Justice Warren's hand-picked successor, Justice Abe For-
tas, resigned from the Court in May of 1969 - not to be replaced until Justice Blackmun was
seated in June, 1970.
166 Maxwell, 398 U.S. at 267.
167 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). With the resignation of Justice Fortas,
Justice Harlan became the crucial fifth vote for a Court supporting reversal on the due pro-
cess requirement of a bifurcated proceeding in capital cases. Although Justice Harlan origi-
nally indicated support for reversal on due process grounds, after preparing a concurring
opinion supporting the majority, he urged the Court to hear re-argument in Maxwell. Once
re-argument was ordered, the Maxwell decision was delayed until the next term. The origi-
nal six person majority was then further compromised by the retirement of Chief Justice
Warren at the end of the 1968 term. Justice Harlan's desire to reconsider Maxwell, com-
bined with the changing Court, allowed Justice Stewart's original idea to reverse on Wither-
spoon grounds to win the day. Although Maxwell never pursued such an issue in the federal
courts, the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit for further
consideration of the applicability of Witherspoon.
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ten convicted of rape, eight were Black males, all of whom were convicted of
raping a White female.168 Certainly the constant evidence that race was a pri-
mary factor in deciding who would be executed led the Court to its decision to
find the application of the punishment violated the Eighth Amendment. As
Justice Douglas explained, the Eighth Amendment was violated because
the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty
to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and
despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular
minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a more protected
position. 169
That decision proved short-lived as, just four years later, the Court decided
in Gregg v. Georgia that, with appropriate procedural safeguards, the death
penalty could withstand constitutional challenge. As soon as the Supreme
Court again gave the green light to the death penalty for certain crimes, the
question of whether it was an appropriate punishment for rape alone (as
opposed to the double crime of rape-murder) was soon again litigated before
the Supreme Court.
In 1972, a year after the Court's decision in Furman and three before the
Court reinstated capital punishment in Gregg, researcher Marvin E. Wolfgang
appeared before a Congressional Committee and testified that of the 455 people
who had been executed for rape since 1930 in the United States, 89.5% had
been non-white.' 70 This overwhelming disparity between the numbers of
Black defendants executed for rape versus White defendants for the same crime
indicated that Blacks were disproportionately punished.' 7 ' It was on this land-
scape that the litigation in Coker v. Georgia was to proceed. At the time, the
petitioner in Coker was one of only five people in the entire country under the
sentence of death for rape.
17 2
The underlying legal argument in Coker was that a sentence of death for
rape was a disproportionate penalty for a crime that did not result in death.
However, the argument was advanced by the significant evidence of the racial
disparities in capital sentencing for rape. For example, the Court considered a
comprehensive study evaluating the application of the death penalty that was
conducted by the Florida Civil Liberties Union. The study focused on the
"relationship between rape, race and the death penalty" in Florida from 1940 to
168 See Respondent's Brief at app. C, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1971) (No. 69-
5003), 1971 WL 126674. Also noteworthy is that the two White males who were sentenced
to death at this time had also raped White females. Id.
169 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
170 See Wolfgang & Riedel, supra note 134, at 123.
171 Id. at 124. The sentiment that Blacks were being punished disproportionately was
echoed by Justice Powell in his Furman dissent: "If a Negro defendant, for instance, could
demonstrate that members of his race were being singled out for more severe punishment
than others charged with the same offense, a constitutional violation might be established."
Furman, 408 U.S. at 449 (Powell, J., dissenting).
172 See Petitioner's Brief, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1976) (No. 75-5444), 1976 WL
181481. Furthermore, two of the five sentenced to death at the petitions time were sentenced
to death under a statute which limited the death penalty to the rape of children. Id.
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1964.173 Florida law imposed a mandatory death sentence upon a guilty verdict
for rape unless the jury, by a majority vote, recommended mercy. 174 From
1940 to 1964, fifty-four men were sentenced to death after being convicted of
rape - six White men and forty-eight Black men. Of the six White men, the
only one to be executed was a homosexual. Three others had their death
sentences commuted by the pardon board and Florida Supreme Court reversed
the death sentence for the remaining two. Further, four of the six White men
raped a White child and the remaining two, whose sentences were reversed,
raped a White adult woman. ' 75 At the time the study was written, twenty-nine
of the forty-eight Black men sentenced to death had already been executed for
rape. 176 The pardon board commuted only two of the Black defendants'
sentences of death for rape. 
177
Unlike many studies at the time, this Florida study incorporated the race of
the victim to further explain why the death penalty was used in certain cases.
The limitations on information about the victim, as previously described by
Professor Johnson, ' 78 were also a major obstacle for the Florida Civil Liberties
Union to overcome. However, after months of careful research a complete
record was obtained of all the rape convictions which included the race of the
victim and defendant. The data showed that no White male had been sentenced
to death for the rape of a Black woman. 179 In contrast, out of eighty-four con-
victions of a Black male defendant with a White female victim, forty-five (or
53%) were sentenced to death.' 80 The study went on to further evaluate the use
of the state's pardon board and the influence of race on the board's decisions to
commute sentences. The facts of this study showed that race played a signifi-
cant role in determining who was ultimately executed for their sentence of
death. '81
Similar trends in the application of the death penalty to rape occurred in
other states throughout the South. 182 Nationally, from 1937 to 1950, all the
173 Florida Civil Liberties Union, Rape: Selective Electrocution Based on Race 2 (1965)
[hereinafter "FCLU Report"].
174 Id. at 2.
175 Id. at 3-4.
176 Id. at 5.
177 Id. at 6.
178 See notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
171 See FCLU Report, supra note 173 at 12. Only one White man has been executed for the
rape of a White female; however, this was for the rape of a White child. "Thus, no white
man has died for the rape of a white adult."
181 Id. During this period only one Black had been sentenced to death for the rape of a
Black woman. That unique sentence, however, was reversed by the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida, resulting in the stark conclusion that "no black man has died for the rape of a black adult
or child." The contrast between other defendant/victim categories is markedly different
when the defendant was a Black male and the victim was a White female. Id. at 11-12.
181 Id. at 14. "The results presented over the 25 year period studied, rule out any possibility
of accident or coincidence. The sad conclusion is inescapable - the death penalty is deliber-
ately utilized by the State of Florida as a device to punish inter-racial sexual attacks by
blacks." The Florida Civil Liberties Union advocated the Fourteenth Amendment be utilized
to stop the discriminatory actions taken by the state. Id.
182 See Wolfgang & Riedel, supra note 134, at 125 (citing a study by Elmer Johnson show-
ing that between 1909 and 1954, of those sentenced to death after a rape conviction, 56%
were Black). See also Brief Amici Curiae of the NAACP et al. at 17, Furman v. Georgia,
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executions for rape occurred in the South with the exception of three which
took place in Missouri.18 3 . From 1909 to 1949 Virginia alone executed fifty-
two Black men after their convictions for rape.' 84 In stark contrast, from 1909
to the early 1950s no White male had been executed for rape in Virginia even
though approximately 800 White men had been convicted of rape.' 85
Louisiana had similar disparities in the way capital punishment was
applied for the crime of rape. Black men in Louisiana were routinely charged
with "aggravated rape" rather than "simple rape" as the former carried an auto-
matic sentence of death upon conviction.' 86 In comparison, White men were
usually charged with "simple rape" or "carnal knowledge" which involved a
sentence as short as one year. 187 Despite the obvious outcome discrimination
inside the justice system, many citizens of Louisiana engaged in vigilantism
and went outside the law to punish Black men for raping - or for simply being
accused of raping - a White woman.' 88 Even though the laws changed to be
color-blind after the Civil War, much of the same mentality from before the
civil war continued in the application of the law.' 8 9 "'[Aillegations of rape
involving Black offenders and [W]hite victims were treated with heightened
408 U.S. 238 (1971) (Nos. 68-5027, 69-5030, 69-5003, 69-5031), 1971 WL 134376 (stating
"[s]lavery was exclusively a Southern phenomenon, lynching was primarily a Southern phe-
nomenon, and the general data with respect to all crimes, and particularly the crime of rape,
indicates that the South has been the prime contributor to the disproportionate application of
the death penalty to blacks.").
183 See, e.g., Hartung, supra note 135, at 15-16. Outside these executions, both Nevada and
the federal government permitted executions for rape; however, none took place during this
time. Similar national figures from 1937 to 1950 showed a general discriminatory trend in
the application of the death penalty for capital offenses. Of the 3029 people executed for all
crimes, 54% were Blacks. To put this figure in perspective, Blacks were therefore over-
represented in the population of those executed by 550% of their representation in the gen-
eral American population. Id. at 15.
184 Id. at 16. One of the most notable cases was that of the Martinsville Seven. Seven
young Black men were found guilty in 1950 of raping a White woman in Martinsville,
Virginia. The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court and was one of the
earlier cases where an argument was made that the sentence of death for rape is primarily
directed against Blacks.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. Furthermore, from 1900 to 1950 there were forty Black men and two White men
executed for rape. However, after 1907 no White males were executed for rape. Id. at 16-
17.
188 Id. at 17 n.12. From 1882 to 1948 there were approximately 335 lynchings. From the
available data eighty-four Black men were killed because they were accused of rape. More-
over, of the two White men who were executed for rape, one was a foreigner to the United
States and the other was not a native Louisianan.
189 See, e.g., Stephen, (a Slave) v. Georgia, 11 Ga. 225 (1852). The pre-Civil War mental-
ity, as shown in Stephen, is the kind that continued into the post civil war era. The court in
Stephen said "rape, and an attempt to commit a rape, by a slave or free person of color, upon
a free white female, are both capitally punished by the laws of this State. It is argued, that
these are distinct offences, and that they must be separately prosecuted ... that upon the trial
of an indictment for any offence, the Jury may find the-accused not guilty of the offence
charged in the indictment, but guilty of an attempt to commit such an offence, without any
special count in said indictment for such attempt, provided the evidence before them will
warrant such finding - applies to offences committed by free white persons, and not to such
as may be committed by persons of color.... The Penal Code was not intended to apply to
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virulence,' both through lynching and through blatant discrimination in the
courts."' 19 0
Even though the majority of the Coker-related studies focused on specific
cities or states, a broader study reviewing the race of the victim in rape cases
was conducted by Marvin E. Wolfgang and Marc Riedel which included data
on the race of the victim in rape cases.' 91 The ultimate conclusion of the study
was that when a Black male raped a White female, his chance of being exe-
cuted turned mainly on the fact that the victim was White. 192 Of the 1238
convicted rape defendants from 1945 thru 1965, 317 were Black defendants
with White victims.1 9 3 Of the 317 Black perpetrator/White victim crime com-
binations 113, or 36%, were sentenced to death. Of the remaining 921 other
racial combinations, 2% of the defendants were sentenced to death. 194 The
Wolfgang and Riedel study used data to show that Black defendants whose
victims were White were sentenced to death 18 times more frequently than
defendants in any other racial combination. 195 The Wolfgang study incorpo-
rated other non-racial contributing factors such as contemporaneous offenses;
however, none of the non-racial factors played a "significant role in explaining
the association between black defendants and the imposition of the death
penalty."' 19
6
Ultimately, the Supreme Court in Coker held that death penalty for the
rape of an adult woman violates the Eighth Amendment proscription of cruel
and unusual punishments.' 97 The opinion barely alludes to the background of
gendered racism that compelled the result.' 9
8
Given the historical context and the application of the law, the mindset
that a rape committed by a Black man against a White woman was "a crime
which arouses the most violent indignation on the part of the whites, and which
they accordingly treat with severity" continued throughout the twentieth cen-
tury.' 99 Similarly, it is not realistic to believe that such discrimination based on
slaves or free persons of color, in any of its enactments, unless they are expressly men-
tioned." 11 Ga. at 241-42.
190 Elizabeth Kennedy, Feminist Sexual Ethics Project, Victim Race and Rape: A Review of
Recent Research 7, http://www.brandeis.edulprojects/fse/slavery/slav-us/slav-us-articles/
slav-us-art-kennedy-full.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2007) (quoting Jennifer Wriggins, Rape,
Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 107 (1983)).
19' Wolfgang & Riedel, supra note 134.
192 Id. at 130.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. The statistical chance of this correlation is less then 1 out of 1000. See also Peti-
tioner's Brief at 34-35, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-5444), 1976 WL
181481 where the included table shows the number of executions for rape from 1946
through 1975. During this period 185 Blacks were executed for rape while 22 Whites were
executed. Black executions peaked at 22 in 1946 while White executions peaked in 1950 at
only 4 executions.
196 Id. at 132-133.
197 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977).
198 In large part as a product of failing to deal honestly with the racial disparities in death
penalty rape cases, the Coker decision has been criticized for an insufficient sensitivity to the
true harm experienced by rape victims.
'99 See Raymond T. Bye, Recent History and Present Status of Capital Punishment in the
United States, 17 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 234 (1926). See also Petitioner's Brief at 36
[Vol. 7:1
RAPE AS A BADGE OF SLAVERY
such potent racial archetypes could be scrubbed from our legal culture with the
Supreme Court's ruling in Coker.
200
IV. RACIAL DISPARITIES AFTER COKER
United States Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall expressed the
dangers of attempting simply to erase the memories of slavery from current
legal analysis, arguing that the experience of Black people in America has been
different in kind, not just degree, from other ethnic groups. 20 1 To Justice Mar-
shall, it was not the history of slavery in and of itself that created this distinc-
tion, but rather the unique fact that a whole people was marked as inferior by
the law. 2 12 It is naive in the extreme to think that the passage of a mere
twenty-five years is sufficient for the elimination of hundreds of years of
gendered racism in criminal prosecutions. Although reforms in rape laws have
created a superior environment for equal treatment of rape victims, 20 3 insistent
and unaddressed racial attitudes continue to infect prosecutors' charging deci-
sions.2°4 Although variables other than race influence various aspects of the
n.63, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-5444), 1976 WL 181481. As of Octo-
ber 1925, the following states permitted the death penalty for rape: Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the Federal
Penal Code. As of 1976, two states, Kentucky and North Carolina, added an automatic death
sentence upon conviction for rape. At the time of the Furman opinion the death penalty for
rape was permitted in "16 States and in the federal courts when committed within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 2031." The number of
states using the death penalty for rape between 1925 and 1970 remained the same. In 1965,
West Virginia stopped using the death penalty; however, Texas began applying the death
penalty for rape during this time period. Id. at 240-42.
200 See Wolfgang & Riedel, supra note 134, at 123. The same concept espoused by Justice
Powell in the Furman opinion should be applied to the racial disparities continuing in
today's justice system: "if a negro defendant, for instance, could demonstrate that members
of his race were being singled out for more severe punishment than others charged with the
same offense, a constitutional violation might be established." Id. (citing Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238, 449 (1972)).
201 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
202 Id. at 400 ("The dream of America as the great melting pot has not been realized for the
Negro; because of his skin color, he never even made it into the pot.").
203 Many commentators, however, have claimed that changes in rape statutes have not sig-
nificantly impacted rape victims' access to justice in either the criminal or civil courts. See
Cassia Spohn & Julia Homey, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTs REVOLUTION AND ITS
IMPACT, 77-104 (1992) (no identifiable change in sexual assault reports, indictments, or con-
victions post-statutory reform); Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary
Look at the Effects of Rape Law Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 554, 573 (1993) ("statutory rape reform has not had a very substantial
effect on either victim behavior or actual practices in the criminal justice system.") See also
Seidman & Vickers, supra note 22, at 467.
204 See Comment, Too Much Justice: A Legislative Response to McCleskey v. Kemp, 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 437, 439-47 (1989) (discussing "the history of disproportionate use
of capital punishment" during slavery and the Reconstruction Period). See also McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 277 (1987); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
Fall 2006]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
judicial process, Black rape victims still suffer from discrimination merely
because they are not White.2 ° 5
A. Recent Race-of-Victim Statistics in Rape Cases
An understanding of current rape prosecutions by race is made difficult
because the discretionary decisions regarding prosecutions are made secretly
and the privilege to do so is jealously guarded by prosecutors' offices. There
have, however, been significant efforts to lift the near-Masonic cloak of secrecy
that shields such decisions from public review and prosecutors from public
accountability.
One of the first issues that must be addressed when discussing rape prose-
cution decisions is the statistic change in frequency of rape as a relative to
population. In many earlier studies and commentaries, it appeared that Black
women were raped at a greater frequency than White women.20 6 In the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, commentators ascribed this quantitative differ-
ence as a product of two factors: the likelihood that Black women would be
raped as part of racial control and terror, 20 7 and the fact that Black women were
more likely to work out of the home and therefore were more vulnerable to
attack.108
However, the slightly confusing statistical differences in rape frequencies
between population groups noted in the first part of the twentieth century have
recently dissipated. Available statistics indicate that by 1998 the differences in
the rate of overall Black and White victimization were statistically insignifi-
cant.20 9 However, when only rape or sexual assault is analyzed between 1993
and 1998, the "average annual rate of rape or sexual assault was somewhat
higher for American Indians than that for blacks, and significantly higher for
American Indians than that for Asians or whites. ' 2 ' 0 Additionally, Asians and
205 See generally Kennedy, supra note 13.
206 GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEX-
UAL ASSAULT (1989).
207 See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
208 See BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 22, 71-72 (1981).
See also Wriggins, supra note 6 at 119 ("because Black women worked outside the home,
they were exposed to employers' sexual aggression as white women who worked inside the
home were not.").
209 CALLIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION AND RACE, 1993-98
1 (2001) [hereinafter VICTIMIZATION AND RACE REPORT]. This Special Report issued by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, the statistical agency of the U.S. Department of Justice, dis-
cussed findings from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) from 1993 through
1998. Regarding all categories of violent victimization, "from 1993 to 1997, Black persons
were victimized at rates significantly greater than those of Whites. By 1998, Black and
White persons were victimized overall at similar rates." Id. Additionally, the statistical rate
comparisons reveal that in 1993, 53.5 Whites/ per "1,000 persons age 12 or older" were
victims of crimes of violence while 69.3 Blacks per "1,000 persons age 12 or older" were
victims of crimes of violence in the same year. In 1994 Whites had a rate of 52.8 per 1000
and Blacks a rate of 64.8 per 1000. By 1998, the rates had mostly equalized, when 38 per
1000 Whites were victimized while 42.8 Blacks were victimized. Id. at 11.
210 Id. at 2. Table 1 states that the "average annual victimizations, by race, 1993-98" shows
that for "persons 12 or older" 5.8 per 1000 American Indians experienced a rape or sexual
assault, while Blacks experienced the same crimes at a rate of 2.2 per 1,000. Additionally,
1.2 per 1000 Asians and 1.8 per 1000 Whites endured at rape or sexual assault.
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Whites experienced "similar" rates of rape or sexual assault during this five-
year span.21'
This is also true of the statistics regarding rape victimization. The average
annual victimization rates from 1993 to 1998 by gender and race indicate that
Black females experienced rape or sexual assault at the rate of 3.7 "per 1,000
persons age 12 or older," while the same rate of rape or sexual assault for
White females was 3.1 per 1000; that is not a statistically significant differ-
ence. 2 12 American Indian females had a 7.5 per 1000 rate of rape or sexual
assault, but this number is based on 10 or fewer sample cases.2 13 The only
statistically significant difference in these rates was for Asian women, who had
"a rate of rape or sexual assault that was slightly lower than the rate for Ameri-
can Indian females and significantly lower than those for white and black
females, 1993_98. ",
2 14
Further, a comparative examination of the previous studies that led to the
impression of statistically significant frequency disparities in cross-racial rapes
concluded that rapes are less interracial and more intra-racial than the popula-
tion demographics would suggest.215 For example, although the study found
that the absolute number of Black offender/White victim sexual assaults was
higher than the number of reported White offender/Black victim sexual
assaults, their frequency relative to the populations was no greater.2 16 This
result occurs because of the unbalanced nature of the relative populations
which in turn results in the much smaller Black population having much more
frequent contact with White people than in the reverse situation.21 7
Other recent statistical reports are marred by small reported numbers and
differing categories of what constitute a reported crime in the category.2 18 One
211 Id.
212 Id. at 3. This addresses the "[a]verage annual violent victimization rates, by gender,
1993-98."
213 id.
214 Id. at 3. As stated above, Asian females had an average annual violent victimization rate
between 1993 and 1998 of 1.8 per "1,000 persons age 12 and older" for rape or sexual
assault.
215 Robert M. O'Brien, The Interracial Nature of Violent Crimes: A Re-Examination, 92
AM. J. Soc. 817, 817 (1987).
216 Id. at 822. See also Larry W. Koch, Interracial Rape: Examining the Increasing Fre-
quency Argument, 26 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 76, 79 (1995).
217 Id. See also PETER M. BLAU, INEQUALITY AND HETEROGENEITY: A PRIMITIVE THEORY
OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 22 (1977) ("Minority groups ... are more involved in inter-group
relations with . . .a majority than the majority group is with them."). See also O'Brien,
supra note 215, at 819 (explaining that in a population of 1000, if 10% are Black and 90%
White, 10 interracial marriages translates to a frequency of 10% interracial marriages for the
Black community but only 1.1% for the White community).
218 See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 276-277 (2002), available at http://www.albany.edu/source
book/archive.html. Like the Victimization and Rape Report, the Sourcebook examines the
"number and rate (per 1,000 persons age 12 and older) of personal victimizations by type of
crime, and sex and race of victim," in the United States. While the sourcebook does include
sub-category tables for rape and sexual assault, these statistics are based on any reported
information which "includes verbal threats of rape and threats of sexual assault." Id. at 196
(Table 3.103 addresses the "estimated number and rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) of offenses
known to police, by offense in the United States 1960-2001").
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such statistical analysis, which explored the "estimated number and rate (per
100,000 inhabitants) of offenses known to police," compared offenses from the
years 1960 to 2002.219 In -1960, 17,190 incidents of forcible rape were
reported, which translates to an overall rate of 9.6 rapes per every 100,000
inhabitants. 220 By 2001, the absolute number of forcible rapes increased to
90,491 which increased the rate to 31.8 forcible rapes per every 100,000 inhab-
itants. 221 Although these statistics are based on information which is unverifi-
able because it was voluntarily supplied by police officials regarding their
understanding of the number of reports of victimization, they none the less
demonstrate a marked increase in the number of reported rapes in the forty-one
year period.
B. System Outcome Bias and "Down Streaming"
Another generalized yet extensive study regarding race-of-victim charging
patterns in capital cases found that "race of victim influence [is] found at all
stages of the criminal justice system process. 22 2 For example, in 1990 the
United States General Accounting Office (GAO) published a report analyzed
twenty-eight existing studies to "determine if the race of either the victim or the
defendant influences the likelihood that defendants will be sentenced to
death."22 3  This evaluation supported the statistical studies presented in
McCleskey224 and revealed that there is a "strong race of victim influence" on
the chances of a defendant being sentenced to the death penalty or "being
charged with a capital crime."'225 Although the death penalty is no longer
available as a punishment for a conviction of rape alone, the types and extent of
race-of-victim bias uncovered in the above General Accounting Office report
implicated crimes other than those for which death is the sentence.
At every phase of initial criminal prosecution - charge, plea, and trial -
prosecuting attorneys enjoy the power of constitutionally protected discre-
tion.226 Results like those from the GAO study have led researchers in the past
fifteen years to investigate how racial disparity and bias infect the decision
making processes of prosecutors. There have been serious research attempts to
discern what factors and procedures lead prosecutors to make decisions that
219 Id. In 1960, there was a "total crime index" of 3,384,200 and by 2001, the number for
the "total crime index" had more than tripled to 11,849,006 incidents.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., REPORT TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITrEES ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES
(1990), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbatl 1/141293.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]
(statement of Lowell Dodge, Director, Admin. of Just. Issues).
223 Id. at 1, 5.
224 See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
225 GAO REPORT, supra note 222. Further, more than 80% of the studies showed that
"those who murdered whites were found to be more likely to be sentenced to death than
those who murdered blacks."
226 See infra notes 261-64 and accompanying text. See also Cassia Spohn & David Hol-
leran, Prosecuting Sexual Assault: A Comparison of Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault
Cases Involving Strangers, Acquaintances, and Intimate Partners, 18 JUST. Q. 651, 652
(2001).
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have demonstrable race-biased outcomes, particularly in relation to the the race
of the victim. In 1991, Professor Lisa Frohmann looked at the practice of pros-
ecutors when making charging and dismissal decisions.2 27 Starting with the
widely held belief that stranger rapes are more aggressively prosecuted than
acquaintance rapes, Professor Frohmann sought to identify how prosecutors
identify and employ their power in the face of deviations from a normative rape
narrative. This prototypical rape is characterized as the kidnapping and forcible
penetration of one White woman by one stranger who is a Black male.
228
Every deviation from this meta-rape narrative is considered less prosecution-
worthy by those who exercise charging discretion.
Professor Frohmann concluded that prosecutors hold a fixed idea of what
constitutes the set of facts most likely to lead to a rape conviction.2 29 This idea
is not only a product of the prosecutor's independent "repertoire of knowledge"
based on experience, 230 but also prosecutors' attempts to pre-figure the impact
that ideas about the paradigmatic rape will have on other decision-makers such
as judges and jurors. Professor Frohmann identifies the overall fixed belief
structure regarding rape as "typifications of rape-relevant behaviors." Froh-
mann further divides the overall rape paradigm into four sub-typifications:
(1) Typifications of rape scenarios: the victim's version of what happened is incon-
sistent with the prosecutor's beliefs about what typically happens in this type of sex-
ual assault (e.g., the typical kidnapping-rape involves a variety of sexual acts and the
victim states that the assault included only forced intercourse) or her behavior at the
time of the assault raises questions about her character (e.g., the fact that she is walk-
ing alone late at night suggests that she is a prostitute);
(2) Typifications of post-incident interactions: the behavior of the victim of an
acquaintance rape is incongruent with the behavior of the typical victim (e.g., she has
consensual sexual intercourse with the suspect following the alleged incident);
(3) Typifications of rape reporting: the victim failed to make a prompt report and her
reasons for late reporting are inconsistent with officially acknowledged and legiti-
mate reasons (e.g., the victim did not report the crime for several days and there is no
evidence that her failure to report was motivated by physical injury or psychological
trauma);
(4) Typifications of victim's demeanor: the victim's facial expression, mannerisms,
and body language are inconsistent with those of a typical rape victim and/or suggest
that the victim is not telling the truth.23 '
Professor Frohmann argues that deviations from these typifications are
considered by prosecutors as reason for case rejection. Further, prosecutors do
not rely solely on their own experience that the deviation from the typification
requires a charge dismissal or reduction. Rather, prosecutors rely on their
227 Lisa Frohmann, Discrediting Victims' Allegations of Sexual Assault: Prosecutorial
Accounts of Case Rejection, 38 Soc. PROBS. 213 (1991) [hereinafter Frohmann,
Discrediting].
228 See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 28 (1987) (Prosecutors distinguish between "jump-
from-the-bushes stranger rapes and the simple cases of unarmed rape by friends, neighbors,
and acquaintances.").
229 Frohmann, Discrediting, supra note 227, at 219.
230 Id. at 217.
231 Cassie Spohn, Dawn Beichner & Erika Davis-Frenzel, Prosecutorial Justifications for
Sexual Assault Case Rejection: Guarding the "Gateway to Justice", 48 Soc. PROBS. 206,
210 (2001) (describing Frohmann's typification paradigm).
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beliefs about what jurors might believe about the deviation from the meta-rape
storyline.
Prosecutors are often interested in concerns other than "justice, 2 32 such as
the likelihood that limited resources will be applied in a case to a positive
result. 2 3 3 The pursuit of this interest often forces prosecutors to consider the
prejudices and biases of a hypothetical "juror. '234 This process is referred to
by Frohmann as "downstreaming" but is more accurately labeled "system out-
come bias." Although there are justifications for biasing decisions in favor of
juror belief structures, prosecutors should be wary when relying on a hypotheti-
cal juror's potential feelings about non-legally relevant factors, such as race.23 5
In a recent follow-up study, Frohmann examined the ways in which class
and race, as related to stereotypes regarding neighborhoods, impacted
prosecutorial discretion. 36 Frohmann found most rape victims are from lower
class, racially mixed or minority communities. Most jurors, however, tend to
come from more culturally homogeneous, predominantly White, middle and
upper-middle class communities. These known class, race, and culture differ-
ences lead prosecutors to exercise their discretion in favor of not proceeding in
rape cases because they fear "misinterpretation by jurors of victims that would
result in 'not guilty' verdicts if the cases were forwarded." Although these
differences are legally insignificant, they have a serious impact on the nature of
prosecution because of prosecutors' downstream orientation and system out-
come bias.
Starting from the very first discretionary decision of prosecutors, another
study indicated that the race of the victim impacts the decision whether to seek
charges.23 7 Researchers, including Professor Cassia Spohn, closely examined
prosecutorial discretion at the initial charging decision in sexual assault cases in
Miami, Dade County, Florida.2 38 The researchers examined the ways in which
prosecutors evaluated the viability of a case based on what they believed other
232 See, MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2004) (ABA model rules for
prosecutors regarding justice duty).
233 One factor affecting prosecutorial decision making is risk aversion, or an attempt to
avoid "uncertainty." C. Albonetti, Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening, and Uncertainty:
Toward a Theory of Discretionary Decision Making in Felony Case Proceedings, 24 CRIMI-
NOLOGY 623 (1986). In terms of outcome, this avoidance of uncertainty is not tied to the
prosecutor's ethical duty to seek justice but to individual prosecutor's desire to win cases.
Id.
234 See infra, Section V (discussing the ethical impropriety of system outcome bias).
235 See infra, Section V (discussing techniques for ending and controlling system outcome
bias). Frohmann notes that another legally insignificant technique employed by prosecutors
is to use juror prejudices to impute ulterior motives to a rape victim. Frohmann, supra note
230, at 221-23. I am certainly not suggesting that a prepared prosecutor should not consider
all the arguments experience suggests a competent defense attorney will make on her client's
behalf. This is an appropriate calculus in the plea negotiations with defendants and their
counsel. Rather, I am arguing that no prosecutor should rely on juror ignorance or prejudice
- particularly with regard to racially gendered rape prosecutions - when deciding whether to
proceed or dismiss.
236 Frohmann, Convictability, supra note 14, at 531.
237 Spohn et al, supra note 234, at 206.
238 Id. at 207. This Spohn study looked at 140 sexual battery cases, from 1997, involving
victims over 12 years old that were "cleared by arrest in 1997 from the Sexual Crimes
Bureau of the Miami-Dade (Miami, Florida) Police Department." Id. at 211. The authors
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decision makers, particularly jurors, would believe about the strength of a wit-
ness or the available evidence.2 39 The study built upon earlier studies that
demonstrated that a charge is more likely to be brought if the defendant is
Black and the victim is White.24 ° What distinguished this study was its look at
how prosecutors employed the paradigmatic "rape" by which all actual reported
rapes were judged and typified.
It was discovered, not surprisingly, that victim characteristics also played
an important part in prosecutor assessments of system outcomes. The further
the victim deviated from a "stand-up" victim, the less likely prosecutors would
be to pursue a case.2 4 1 For example, prosecutors routinely consider what effect
the victim's risk-taking behavior, lifestyle, and the facts of the assault itself
would have on juror determinations of witness/victim credibility.2 42
However important the assessments of victim behavior were to the
prosecutorial decision, the study data demonstrated that victim race was a
strong factor in the prosecutor's decision regarding juror acceptance of the
charges as "prosecutors rejected charges more often if the victim was a racial
minority or if the suspect was [B]lack. ' '1 43 The researchers found that over half
- 58.1% - of "all rejections and dismissals" involved Black victims. 244 In
contrast, only 31.1% of all rejected or dismissed cases involved victims who
were White.2 45
conclude that "the decision to file charges was based on a combination of case and victim
characteristics" which included race. Id. at 206.
239 Id. at 207. The research group termed this effect "downstream orientation," but I will
use the more descriptive term, "system outcome bias," which I define as adopting presumed
yet unknown prejudices of others to explain obvious discriminatory effects of ones own
actions.
240 Id. at 228. The authors specifically set out to "replicate and extend Frohmann's research
on prosecutorial accounts of case rejection." Id. See Frohmann, Discrediting, supra note
227, at 217 (prosecutors rely on their "typifications of rape-relevant behavior" in charging
decisions); Frohmann, Convictability, supra note 14, at 531 (prosecutors apply class and
race stereotypes of neighborhoods to victims of sexual assault).
241 Spohn, Beichner & Davis-Freznel, supra note 231, at 207. "Stand-up" victim as used by
the authors and in this article is a person who a jury would consider both "credible and
undeserving of victimization." Id., citing Elizabeth Stanko, The Impact of Victim Assess-
ment on Prosecutor's Screening Decisions: The Case of the New York County District
Attorney's Office, 16 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 225 (1981-82); George F. Cole, CRIMINAL Jus-
TICE: LAW AND POLITICS 172 (1988).
242 Spohn, Beichner & Davis-Freznel, supra note 231, at 215-220.
243 Id. at 226. The researchers reported on the several reasons prosecutors suggested for
rejecting sexual assault cases including: "[Prosecutors] rejected charges less often if the
victim was between thirteen and sixteen years old. Charge rejection was also more likely if
the victim engaged in any risk-taking behavior at the time of the incident, or if the victim's
moral character was called into question by evidence in the file." Further, "cases involving
strangers were substantially more likely than those involving other types of victim/suspect
relationships to be rejected or dismissed." Prosecutorial rejection of sexual assault cases was
not entirely limited to these rationales. See id. The rationale for rejection of sexual assault
cases for Black suspect/defendants was fairly evenly split between questions of victim credi-
bility and failure of the victim to pursue charges. Id. at 224.
244 Id. at 224, tbl.3.
245 Id. Hispanic victims or those associated with "other" racial groups made up only 10.9%
of dismissals and rejections. Id.
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Examining the effects of system outcome bias, Professor Spohn was
involved, with Professor David Holleran, in another research review of sexual
assault case prosecutorial decisions in two additional jurisdictions, Kansas City
and Philadelphia.246 The initial hypothesis of the study was to determine
whether jurors - and therefore prosecutors - perceive sexual assaults between
acquaintances as less prosecution-worthy than similar crimes between stran-
gers.247 Contrary to the general beliefs about "real rape," 248 the researchers
found that prosecutorial decisions to dismiss or initially not to seek charges did
not greatly decrease with increased with offender/victim familiarity.24 9 The
factors that led to a failure to indict or dismissal of charges in most stranger
rape cases and acquaintance rape cases involved legally relevant missing or
inadequate evidence necessary to prove an element of the crime.25°
What was unexpected was that the race of the victim played an important
part in prosecutorial decisions - even in stranger rape cases. Spohn and Hol-
leran concluded that "prosecutors were more likely to file rape charges if the
victim were white."25  Specifically, "prosecutors were 41h times more likely to
file charges if the victim was white, 252 than if the victim was Black. This
race-based victim discrepancy was particularly pronounced in stranger rape
cases in which no weapon was used.25 3 Prosecutors filed 75% of cases in
which a White woman was attacked by an unarmed stranger, but in only 34%
of similar cases when the victim was Black.254 The researchers further found
that the aggravated nature of the crime was the area in which the largest race
effects occurred in that prosecutors were "least likely to file charges when the
victim was black and the suspect did not use a weapon; they were most likely
to file charges when the victim was white and the suspect used a weapon. "255
Previous research had suggested that "the effect of legally irrelevant sus-
pect and victim characteristics is confined to less serious cases, in which deci-
sion makers have more discretion in determining the appropriate outcome." '256
This study indicated, however, that in regard to charging discretion in stranger
rape cases, race of victim was a critical factor for prosecutors:
In these two jurisdictions, [Kansas City and Philadelphia], prosecutors were more
likely to file charges against men who assaulted white women who were strangers to
246 Spohn & Holleran, supra note 226. The jurisdictions were chosen because they each
had invested in specific prosecutorial specialists in sexual assault. Id. at 662.
247 Id. at 651.
248 The "real rape" theory postulated by Estrich, supra note 231, was supported by research
previously conducted by LaFree. LAFREE, supra note 208.
249 Spohn & Holleran, supra note 226, at 670-71. Some of the victim characteristics or
actions that prosecutors believed would affect jurors were drinking, drugging, walking alone,
hitchhiking, prior sexuality, being a single mother, exotic dancer, or sex worker. Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 680.
252 Id. at 671.
253 Id. at 673. This reaffirms the basic hypothesis that the more aggravated the rape - the
closer it is to the paradigmatic rape - the less race bias effects are observed.
254 Id. at 674, tbl. 4.
255 Spohn & Holleran, supra note 226, at 673.
256 Id. at 680 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966);
Cassia Spohn & Jerry Cederblom, Race Disparities in Sentencing: A Test of the Liberation
Hypothesis, 8 JUST. Q. 305 (1991)).
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them than men who assaulted black women who were strangers to them. The fact
that this did not appear in the other two relationship categories [acquaintances and
intimate partners] suggests that prosecutors view aggravated sexual assaults on white
women as particularly serious.
2 5 7
The uncontroverted results of research since Coker suggest that the centu-
ries-long history of disparate treatment of Black rape victims continues today.
This research, when considered as a body, indicates the confluence of three
important aspects of prosecutorial discretion in rape cases: first, prosecutors
rely on typification of rape narratives; second, prosecutors' understanding of
typification incorporates jurors' class, culture, and race biases; and third, prose-
cutors' use of system outcome biases results in undervaluing and under-prose-
cuting the rape of Black women.
V. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
The role of the prosecutor in the continuing under-representation of Black
women in rape prosecutions must be addressed. It cannot be claimed that every
rape prosecution is racially motivated or even that every prosecutor makes
racially disparate charging decisions. What all available evidence points to,
however, is a pervasive and intransient effect of gendered racism in current
rape charging decisions. Further, there is no research that proves the contrary
theory that rape prosecution decisions are utterly free from gendered racism.
Prosecutorial discretion plays a pervasive role in the administration of
criminal justice.2 58 The fate of those caught up in the criminal justice system
lies in the hands of prosecutors. The prosecutor exercises near unlimited power
to determine the charge, to offer plea bargains and to determine the severity of
punishment.2 59 This extensive authority is exercised out of public view, with-
out objective criteria, and is essentially not reviewable. The presumption that
prosecutors act in good faith has created a virtual immunity for prosecutors'
pre-trial decisions.2 60
257 Spohn & Holleran, supra note 226, at 680-81.
258 See, e.g., Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administra-
tive Law for Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 477 (1976)
(describing the prosecutor as "the single most powerful figure in the administration of crimi-
nal justice"); Jeffrey Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2
Bun'. CRIM. L. REV. 249, 272 (1998) (noting that the prosecutor "has the freedom of a
private actor but without the constraint of guidelines regulation"); Tracey L. McCain, The
Interplay of Editorial and Prosecutorial Discretion in the Perpetuation of Racism in the
Criminal Justice System, 25 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 601, 638 (1992) (commenting that
"the broad discretion enjoyed by prosecutors has resulted in an unguarded entrance for
racism"). See also James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1521 (1981).
259 See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (asserting that "[s]o long as
the prosecutor has probable cause ... the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion"); Elisa-
beth Alden Bresee, Prosecutorial Discretion, 75 GEO. L.J. 859, 861 (1987) (asserting that
"prosecuting attorneys have been granted absolute immunity from civil liability for their
actions in initiating, pursuing, and presenting criminal charges").
260 See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 393, 406
(citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986), Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598 (1985),
U.S. v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979)). Prosecutors are protected not only by immunity
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Limited resources and crowded criminal dockets force prosecutors to
make many quasi-judicial decisions: determining whom to charge, the severity
of the charge, whether to offer a plea and whether to proceed to trial. Yet there
are few restraints on the prosecutor's choices at these critical points leading to
trial. There are not, in most cases, articulated policies, procedures, or objective
criteria for plea bargaining or charging.2 6' This environment of too many cases
and too little guidance is most susceptible to the influences of centuries-long
gendered race narratives of what is a prosecutable rape.
I propose three ways of assessing and addressing the continuing race dis-
parities in rape prosecutions. First, prosecutors should adopt "best practices,"
including standards and procedures that would recognize and end system out-
come bias in charging, standardize prosecutorial charging decisions by devel-
oping and employing legal rejection criteria, and increase the accountability of
discretionary charging decisions by implementing charging panels for sexual
assault cases.
Second, legislatures should require information be gathered and reported
on all legal aspects of a sexual assault - from its initial report to its final dispo-
sition. This information would include the race of the victim and perpetrator(s)
and would be organized and publicly disseminated by the state or federal
government.
Third, in egregious cases, victims should litigate for their right to be pro-
tected through prosecution. This might take the form of an order that a prose-
cutor proceed with a case, the appointment of a special prosecutor, or monetary
damages for failing to prosecute. Certainly, this remedy would be available
only in the most blatantly discriminatory situations, but it is naive to think that
such situations do not exist.
A. Discretion, Race-of-Victim and Equal Protection
Perhaps the case most relevant to the question of a prosecutor's constitu-
tional duty when serious race of victim disparities have been demonstrated is
McCleskey v. Kemp. Fifteen years before McCleskey was decided, Justice
Douglas concluded that the death penalty, as then imposed, violated the Eighth
Amendment because of the racially discriminatory aspects of capital conviction
doctrines, but also by such factors as (1) the hesitation of defense lawyers to bring suit
against them for fear of legal revenge, (2) the propensity of jurors to side with prosecutors
and discredit criminal defendants who might sue them, and (3) the limited restoration that
adversely affected criminal defendants are likely to achieve. See Fred C. Zacharias, Speci-
ficity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of
Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 257 n.101 (1993).
261 Critics of the current pre-trial system claim that prosecutors are not capable of develop-
ing their own policies to deal with discretion. See, e.g., KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 196, 212 (1969) (asserting that prosecutors, if left on
their own to limit their discretion, "do little or nothing," and that "abuses are common");
Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532
(1970) (proclaiming that much of prosecutorial discretion is superfluous and that a reform of
substantive criminal law would eliminate some crimes and any statutory overlap). See also
David C. James, The Prosecutor's Discretionary Screening and Charging Authority, 29 THE
PROSECUTOR 22 (1995) (urging adherence to ethical duties in screening and charging deci-
sions and calling for written policies).
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and sentencing.262 Douglas found the capital punishment laws of the time
"pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compati-
ble with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on
'cruel and unusual' punishments. ' 263 After the re-institution of the death pen-
alty across the country in 1976,264 the issue of whether the new death penalty
statutes were applied in a racially discriminatory fashion was long the subject
of speculation. In the 1986 term, the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue
in McCleskey v. Kemp. The petitioner, Warren McCleskey, claimed that the
Georgia death penalty statute, first found constitutional in Gregg v. Georgia,26 5
was applied in a racially discriminatory fashion in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment266 and the "cruel and unusual"
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.2 67 Mr. McCleskey also came to
Court with the sophisticated statistical evidence to prove his claim.
2 68
The Supreme Court cast Mr. McCleskey's claims and evidence as
"whether a complex statistical study that indicates a risk that racial considera-
262 Furman v. Georgia , 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying
text.
263 Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
264 See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
265 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See also supra, notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
266 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 (1987).
267 See id. at 299.
261 See id. at 286:
In support of his claim, McCleskey proffered a statistical study performed by Professors David
C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth (the Baldus study) .... The Baldus study is
actually two sophisticated statistical studies that examine over 2,000 murder cases that occurred
in Georgia during the 1970's. The raw numbers collected by Professor Baldus indicate that
defendants charged with killing white persons received the death penalty in 11% of the cases, but
defendants charged with killing blacks received the death penalty in only 1% of the cases ....
Baldus also divided the case according to the combination of the race of the defendant and
the race of the victim. He found that the death penalty was assessed in 22% of the cases involv-
ing black defendants and white victims; 8% of the cases involving white defendants and black
victims; 1% of the cases involving black defendants and black victims; and 3% of the cases
involving white defendants and black victims. Similarly, Baldus found that prosecutors sought
the death penalty in 70% of the cases involving black defendants and white victim; 32% of the
cases involving white defendants and white victims; 15% of the cases involving black defendants
and black victims; and 13% of the cases involving white defendants and black victims.
Baldus subjected his data to an extensive analysis, taking account of 230 variables that
could have explained the disparities on nonracial grounds. One of his models concludes that,
even after taking account of 39 nonracial variables, defendants killing white victims were 4.3
times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks. According
to this model, black defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive a death sentence as other
defendants. Thus, the Baldus study indicates that black defendants, such as McCleskey, who kill
white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty.
Further, the entire Baldus study, complete with analysis of death penalty jurisprudence in
relation to claims of racial discriminatory impact, has been published: D. Baldus, G. Wood-
worth & C. Pulaski, EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990). See also Berger et
al., supra note 48; A. Bynam, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments - The Death Penalty
Survives, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 921 (1988); J. Cook, Coming Full Circle: A
Return to Arbitrary Sentencing Patterns in Capital Punishment Cases, 56 UMKC L. REV.
387 (1988); M. E. Holland, McCleskey v. Kemp: Racism and the Death Penalty, 20 CONN.
L. REV. 1029 (1988); R. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1388 (1988).
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tions enter into capital sentencing determinations proves that petitioner
McClesky's capital sentence is unconstitutional under the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendment. '269 The majority, led by Justice Powell, began its analysis of
McCleskey's claims with the Equal Protection arguments.2 70 The Court placed
the burden of proving the existence of purposeful racial discrimination on
McCleskey. 27t The specific translation of that burden to this case was that "to
prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must prove that the deci-
sionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. 2 72 The Court ulti-
mately found that proof of discriminatory impact was insufficient and that to
prevail, a defendant must present "evidence specific to his own case that would
support an inference that racial considerations played a part in his sentence." '27 3
Although the Court conceded that such blatant statistical disparities based
on race were sufficient proof in other contexts, 7 4 it was unwilling to extend
that analysis to situations where a defendant was complaining about the fair-
ness of procedures that would result in his death.275 Relying on the "nature of
the capital sentencing decision, particularly the involvement of different
jurors in each case,277 the Court concluded that statistical analysis, like that
accepted in other Equal Protection Clause challenges, would not be viable
proof in the death penalty sentencing context.278 Moreover, the Court con-
269 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 282-83. By using the words "risk" and "prove" in their con-
struction of McCleskey's claims, the Court prefigured the means of denying them. See id. at
291 n.7: "Even a sophisticated multiple-regression analysis such as the Baldus study can
only demonstrate a risk that the factor of race entered into some capital sentencing decisions
and a necessarily lesser risk that race entered into any particular sentencing decision."
270 Id. at 291. The Court characterizes the basis of McCleskey's claims as "persons who
murder whites are more likely to be sentenced to death than persons who murder blacks, and
black murderers are more likely to be sentenced to death than white murderers." (note omit-
ted). By replacing the various forms of "murder" with equivalent forms of "rape," the
Court's construction is a perfect description of the gendered racism infecting such prosecu-
tions. Because this article is focused on a victim's right to be protected by the laws, I will
not treat McCleskey's Eighth Amendment claims in any detail.
271 Id. at 292.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 292-293.
274 Id. at 293-294. Specifically, the Court refers to claims brought pursuant to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 294.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 294-295. The Court supported this rejection on the further grounds that it would
be difficult to rebut the assumption created by the statistics because jurors could not testify
about the motives of their verdicts and prosecutors should not have to. Id. at 296. The Court
conflated the guilt determination with the punishment decision. McCleskey did not chal-
lenge the fact of his conviction, only the fact that he, as a Black man who was involved in
the killing of a White man, was much more likely to be executed for the crime. As Justice
Brennan pointed out in his dissent:
The capital sentencing rate for all white-victim cases was almost 11 times greater than the rate
for black-victim cases. Furthermore, blacks who kill whites are sentenced to death at nearly 22
times the rate of blacks who kill blacks, and more than 7 times the rate of whites who kill blacks.
In addition, prosecutors seek the death penalty for 70% of black defendants with white victims,
but for only 15% of black defendants with black victims, and only 19% of white defendants with
black victims.
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cluded that "absent far stronger proof, it is unnecessary to seek such a rebuttal,
because a legitimate and unchallenged explanation for the decision is apparent
from the record: McCleskey committed an act for which the United States
Constitution and Georgia laws permit imposition of the death penalty." 7 9
Therefore, the fact of guilt and the importance of discretion in the criminal
justice system28 ° defeated McCleskey's Equal Protection Clause claim.2 8
Since the decision in McCleskey, other studies have confirmed the stark
pattern of race-of-victim disparities in criminal law sentencing.28 2 Ultimately,
Id. at 326-327 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). These statistics led Justice Bren-
nan to conclude: "The statistical evidence in this case thus relentlessly documents the risk
that McCleskey's sentence was influenced by racial considerations." Id. at 328.
279 Id. at 296-297 (note omitted).
280 Id. at 297: "Implementation of these laws necessarily requires discretionary judgments.
Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand exception-
ally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused." Id.
281 In rejecting McCleskey's claim, the Court also considered "additional concerns" that
informed its decision. Id. at 314. The first was that "McCleskey's claim, taken to its logical
conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal jus-
tice system." Id. at 314-315. This conclusion led the Court to worry that "if we accepted
McCleskey's claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision,
we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty." Id. at 315 (note
omitted). The Court also fretted that if they accepted McCleskey's claim regarding race, it
might later be faced with claims that related to "membership in other minority groups, and
even to gender." Id. at 316-317 (notes omitted). The Court clearly feared a future of endless
equal protection litigation: "As these examples illustrate, there is no limiting principle to the
type of challenge brought by McCleskey." Id. at 318 (note omitted).
Justice Brennan dissented in a moving and impassioned opinion. Id. at 320 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). On the Court's concern that other litigation might follow a ruling in favor of
McCleskey, Brennan famously wrote:
The Court next states that its unwillingness to regard petitioner's evidence as sufficient is based
in part on the fear that recognition of McCleskey's claim would open the door to widespread
challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing. Taken on its face, such a statement seems to
suggest a fear of too much justice.
Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
282 See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death And Denial: The Tolerance of Racial
Discrimination In Infliction of The Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 434-35 nn.
7-15 (1995). In a report to Congress in 1990, the United States General Accounting Office
(GAO), after reviewing various studies, declared that the death penalty was much more
likely to be imposed if the defendant is Black and the victim is White. The GAO confirmed
the following: "Our synthesis of the 28 studies shows a pattern of evidence indicating racial
disparities in the charging, sentencing, and imposition of the death penalty" and that "race of
victim influence was found at all stages of the criminal justice system process". U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFF., Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates Pattern of Racial Disparities, in
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, 5-6 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed.,
1990); see Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About
the Department of Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 380 (1999) (noting that race
played a statistically significant role in determining who receives the death penalty). It has
been noted that one of the common trends in prosecutorial decisions is the devaluing of lost
lives in poorer communities. Deaths in these communities are not treated as if they have the
equivalent social value as the loss of the lives of victims from a more prosperous commu-
nity. In other words, homicides in urban jurisdictions are downgraded by prosecutors as a
matter of passive public policy. See, e.g., Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of
Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only "The Appearance of Justice"?, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 283 (1996); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and
Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAW & Soc'¥ REV. 587, 616 (1985).
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the Supreme Court, when given the opportunity to look at the responsibility
that prosecutors owe to victims chose instead to focus their attention on what
juries constitutionally owe to convicted defendants. In extolling its own
"'unceasing efforts to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice sys-
tem,"283 the Court apparently mistook the effort for the act by ignoring the
potential and actual discrimination against victims resulting from unfettered
prosecutorial discretion.284
B. Remedies for Racial Disparities in Charging
The gendered racism in rape prosecutions has been well researched and
documented. However, little has been done to correct the obvious racial dispar-
ities in rape prosecutions. By employing an escalating set of remedies, from
internal prosecutor office procedures, through legislative mandates to litigation,
the longstanding problem of undervaluing Black victims in rape cases might
begin to be addressed.
1. Improving Prosecutorial Discretion Procedures
The only ethical action for a prosecutor to take in the face of the over-
whelming conclusion of history and research is to recognize that gendered
racism in rape prosecutions is a real problem. 285 The problem is best addressed
by prosecutors taking responsible actions within their discretionary sphere.
After all, discretion is constitutionally protected because of the system's need
for prosecutors to make independent judgments. However, with this protection
comes the concomitant responsibility to exercise actual informed discretion
rather than to act in a sloppy and ultimately racially disparate fashion.
The first and perhaps most obvious action would be to end system out-
come bias or "downstream orientation" at charging. This proposal may seem
counterintuitive since the jury might make the ultimate decision whether a
crime is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, many factors compel the
conclusion that system outcome bias is simply a way of infecting prosecutor
decisions with prejudice that is not examined or owned by the prosecutor. In
short, it is a way of blaming hypothetical jurors for the prosecutor's gendered
racism. This is part true because of the prosecutors' overt generalization and
stereotyping regarding of what a "juror" will find credible.
Second, the most important reality of the criminal justice system is that
jurors rarely are involved in any decision making. Most cases end in a guilty
283 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309.
284 See Jane W. Gibson-Carpenter & James E. Carpenter, Race, Poverty, and Justice:
Looking Where the Streetlight Shines, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 103 (1994) (comment-
ing that the majority's focus in McCleskey on the bifurcated death penalty procedure, which
places limits on the jury's discretion to recommend death, essentially ignored the problem of
excessive prosecutorial discretion).
285 As with so many unexamined issues, the first step is accepting that the problem exists.
See William Berman, When Will They Ever Learn? Learning and Teaching From Mistakes
in the Clinical Context 14 CLINICAL L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (discussing a paradigm for
recognizing, admitting and ameliorating mistakes).
[Vol. 7:1
RAPE AS A BADGE OF SLAVERY
plea.28 6 Available studies indicate that nearly nine in every ten cases result in a
plea agreements.2 87 In light of the how rarely jurors are called upon to decide
anything, the use of a hypothetical "juror" - not to mention one that is race and
gender biased - is not the exercise of discretion but rather its abdication.
Third, system outcome bias seems premised more on the value of con-
victability rather than the value of justice. If prosecutors consider non-legal
factors in their charging determination based on the supposed prejudices of a
future jury, then they are in effect valuing winning over prosecuting someone
who is likely guilty of a terrible crime. Although there are real constraints on
prosecutorial time and resources, increasing the number of rape cases charged,
considering the long history of disparate treatment of Black victims, would not
substantially increase the prosecutorial burden. Further, the fear of "losing"
before a jury should not be a lead motivating factor in the pursuit of a prosecu-
tor's duty to seek justice on behalf of the public.
Instead of outcome system bias and down stream juror orientation, prose-
cutors should develop criteria for case acceptance, rather than case rejection.
These standards should be based on legal criteria including whether the neces-
sary evidence exists to prove all elements, availability of witnesses, evidence of
identification in a stranger rape case, evidence regarding the reporting time, and
physical evidence of assault. This evidence should be evaluated without regard
to questions of credibility or motive of the victim, which are factors best suited
to consideration during later plea negotiations. The focus on standards for
charging, rather than reasons for not charging, would further help prosecutors
exercise their discretion in a more responsible fashion.
In addition to standards for charging, prosecutors should spread the discre-
tion among several attorneys with both experience in the office and an under-
standing of the community. This could be accomplished by creating charging
committees for sexual assault cases. 288 Such Charge Review Committees
would operate like case rounds in the medical profession. Before a final deci-
sion not to charge in a sexual assault case, three or more prosecutors would
formally meet to consider the charging criteria and available evidence. This
decision should be made without reference to system outcome juror bias. The
purpose of such a committee is to spread the burden of discretionary decision-
286 See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 24 (1998); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial
Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981).
287 See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to "Guilty": Plea Bargaining as Negotiation,
2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 117 n.7 (1997) (collecting studies regarding plea rates).
288 Most of the discussion regarding charging committees surrounds prosecutorial discretion
in the death penalty charging context. See Nicci Lovre-Laughlin, Lethal Decisions: Exam-
ining the Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Capital Cases in South Dakota and the Federal
Justice System, 50 S.D. L. REV. 550 (2005) (comparing federal death penalty "Review Com-
mittee" and South Dakota's unfettered prosecutorial charging discretion); John A. Horowitz,
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating a Committee to Decide Whether
to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2571 (1997); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel
for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103
YALE L.J. 1835 (1994); Edward C. Brewer, III, Let's Play Jeopardy: Where the Question
Comes After the Answer for Stopping Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death-Penalty Cases, 28
N. Ky. L. REV. 34 (2001) (ethical error rates for prosecution offices suggest need for charg-
ing review committee).
Fall 2006]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
making, ensure that decisions are generally consistent over time, and increase
the accountability of the ultimate charging decision.
If adopted, these procedures would decrease the influence of external,
non-legal biases in the decision to charge a rape crime. Such a decrease in
system outcome biases would result in some improvement in the race-of-victim
disparities in sexual assault charging. The advantage for prosecutors of adopt-
ing such procedures is that it would stave off future intrusive remedies by keep-
ing the improvements within the closely guarded sphere of in-office exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.
2. Legislative Remedies
One step removed from internal changes impacting decision-making
within prosecutors' offices would be some efforts in state legislatures to require
charging standards and review committees. The victims' rights lobby is power-
ful in most states and prosecutors would have a difficult time arguing that such
changes would be onerous or inappropriate.
More intrusive legislative measures, however, should be considered. Spe-
cifically, the state and federal governments should require systematic record-
keeping regarding sexual assault cases which would include race of victim and
offender(s).28 9 Such record gathering would allow more accurate research and
increase the potential for informed community responses to practices that are
otherwise hidden.
A model for such recordkeeping and reporting legislation is the Federal
Hate Crimes Statistics Act.29 ° Under that Act, Congress imposed a duty on the
United States Attorney General to acquire information related to "hate
crimes."291 Interestingly, the Hate Crime Statistics Act includes "forcible
rape" among the categories of crimes in which manifestations of discrimination
assault might occur.292 However, the statute does not require the collection of
all data for the crime of forcible rape.293 Although the reporting duty is partic-
ularly aimed at the United States Attorney General, the law contemplates both
input and dissemination of database information to all state law enforcement
294
agencies.
289 I fully endorse Professor Davis' call for racial impact studies regarding all types of
criminal charging. See Davis, supra note 286 at 54:
Not every disparity is evidence of discrimination .... A prerequisite to eliminating race dis-
crimination in the criminal process is the determination of whether dissimilar treatment of simi-
larly situated people is based on race rather than some legitimate reason. Whether the treatment
is intentional or purposeful should not matter - the goal should be the elimination of the harm.
Thus, the first step is the implementation of racial impact studies designed to reveal racially
discriminatory treatment. The second step is the publication of these studies so victims of dis-
crimination and the general public may act to eradicate undesired policies and practices.
However, in the context of the specific history of discrimination in sexual assault cases, I
believe data gathering regarding this crime is the best place to start.
290 Hate Crime Statistics Act, 28 U.S.C. §534 (2000).
291 These are defined as "crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion,
disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity". Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275
(1990).
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 28 U.S.C. §534(e)(2) (2000).
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The simplest legislative route would be to specifically include "rape" as a
hate crime for the purposes of the reporting statute. However, this solution
would certainly engender legislative controversy. 295 Although the violent
stranger rape scenario would seem to fit the bill as a crime manifesting a
prejudice based on gender, the same is not so obvious in complaints of same-
sex rape. Also, the argument regarding the gendered nature of the hate crime
categorization for rape diminishes the very real racial disparities associated
with prosecution of the offense. Further, jurisdictions often already aggravate
sentencing in rape, thereby further classifying the act as a hate crime duplica-
tive.2 96 For these reasons, and because of the gendered racism of rape prosecu-
tions that affects both victims and defendants, it is preferable to seek separate
reporting requirement legislation for all types of sexual assault based on the
reporting structure of the Hate Crimes Statistics Act.
Publication and access to such records would also further the goal of
informing voters regarding the impact the prosecutor's decisions are having in
his or her jurisdiction. The vast majority of prosecutors are elected from at-
large districts.2 9 7 However, the means of operating their charge to the public
that elected them is a secret process not understood by either citizens or, in
most cases, the prosecutors themselves. The access to information on even one
category of cases would greatly enhance the ability of citizens to evaluate the
quality of the work performed by their representative in the criminal justice
system.2 9 8 In this way, communities could assess whether a particular prosecu-
tor office was actually working on behalf of all in the district, or primarily on
behalf of those who were White. 299
3. Litigation Remedies
Finally, in egregious cases of plain discriminatory intent vis-a-vis which
victims receive the attention of a prosecutor, litigation would be another rem-
edy. As described above, the courts have made it very difficult to litigate racial
295 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281 (1991); Steve Bennett Weisburd & Brian Levin, "On the Basis of Sex": Recognizing
Gender-Based Bias Crimes, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 21 (1994); Kathryn M. Carney, Rape:
The Paradigmatic Hate Crime, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 315 (2001).
296 See Jonathan David Selbin, Bashers Beware: The Continuing Constitutionality of Hate
Crimes After R.A.V., 72 OR. L. REV. 157, 203 (1993).
297 As of 1990, one researcher put the percentage of elected chief prosecutors at over 90%.
Bill Isaeff, Qualification, Selection, and Term, in STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES 15, 15 (Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990). In seven states and in the federal
government, the chief prosecutors are appointed. Davis, supra note 286, at 57 n. 228. See
Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor's Perspective: Race of the Discretionary
Actors, 83 CORNELL L REV. 1811 (1998) (detailing the race of chief prosecutors with charg-
ing authority in capital cases) [hereinafter Pokorak, Probing].
298 Regardless whether elected or appointed, a prosecutor's duty is to represent the public in
criminal matters in the courts. As Professor Davis explains: "The elected prosecutor
emerged during the rise of Jeffersonian democracy in the 1820s .... No longer beholden to
the governor or the court, the prosecutor was deemed accountable to this amorphous body
called 'the people,' specifically his constituents." Davis, supra note 286, at 57-58 (notes
omitted).
299 Pokorak, Probing, supra note 297, at 1819 ("expression of unconscious bias may result
from the similarity between prosecutor and the victim populations").
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disparity cases. However, as also noted above, these results invariably came in
cases in which defendants sought relief from conviction or sentence. These
cases reveal a tension between a prosecutor's two roles: on one hand as advo-
cate for punishment in a particular case and on the other as a critical public
servant charged in part with the duty to fairness and equality in the administra-
tion of criminal justice. 3°° The tension in almost every case in which there was
not evidence of purposeful discrimination is resolved in favor of the prosecutor
and against the defendant. This is primarily because the defendant's ultimate
vindication is presumed to come in the question of individual guilt of
innocence.3 °1
Such tension does not exist vis-a- vis victims. No one would argue that
prosecutors are required to pursue every complaint regardless of evidence.3"'
However, it is reasonable for citizens and courts to expect that the decision as
to which victims' cases proceed should be based on articulable legal standards
rather than prejudice or bias. The Supreme Court has indicated that a different
analysis is appropriate when the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
clause complaint belongs to an actor other than the defendant. For example, in
Batson v. Kentucky,3 °3 the Court held that the prosecutors could not exercise
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory fashion,3° despite the fact
that peremptory challenges were traditionally discretionary and previously
required neither rhyme nor reason to explain their exercise.30 5
In a series of cases following Batson, the court identified the equal protec-
tion claim as belonging to the juror who was dismissed for unconstitutional
reasons. 3 ' As such, any party to the case, civil or criminal, or the judge sua
sponte could complain about the discriminatory use of a peremptory chal-
lenge. 30 7 The vindication of the juror's right was independent of the outcome
31 See Davis, supra note 286, at 52. I wish to thank Professor Davis for this insight into
the tensions when defendants litigate racial disparity claims.
301 Id. at 52-53 ("If the defendants . .. are guilty ... the government and society have an
interest in their prosecution and punishment.").
302 This position would require the "tortification" of criminal law - where the prosecutor
was merely a publicly paid representative of an aggrieved and litigious victim.
303 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Batson was decided the term before McCleskey.
304 Id. at 96. The Court in Batson developed a three-part prima facie test for determining
whether a juror was unconstitutionally excluded requiring the defendant in the first instance
to show that (1) the defendant was a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) that members
of that group have been excluded from the jury; and (3) the circumstances suggest that the
exclusion was based on race. Since Batson, this prima facie test has been changed to only
require a showing of two and three above, eliminating the need for defendant and removed
juror to share a racial identity. See infra note 310.
305 Id. at 91, 93.
306 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (defendant may object to race-based
exclusion regardless of race of defendant); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55-56 (state
has standing to challenge defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges).
307 The current structure of a Batson challenge requires a prima facie showing by the mov-
ing party that a juror has been removed based on a discriminatory reason. Thereafter, the
burden shifts to the challenged party to offer a race-neutral reason for the use of the peremp-
tory challenge. Finally, the burden of persuasion returns to the moving party to demonstrate
that the reason proffered is either not race neutral or is pretextual and thereby convince the
court that the juror was removed as a result of purposeful discrimination. See Purkett v.
Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam).
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of the trial and therefore did not implicate the same balancing of interests
implicated by claims of discrimination asserted by a defendant.
The same is true of victims - particularly Black victims of rape. The
history of rape as a badge of slavery, even more devastating than the sad his-
tory of excluding Black citizens from juries, requires more than simple asser-
tions of the right to exercise discretion. In these cases, it should be incumbent
on prosecutors to explain legal reasons for dismissal other than general denials
of racial animus.
Such litigation would proceed under both the Thirteenth Amendment and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A victim whose
case was dismissed by prosecutors for inappropriate reasons could bring suit
for an injunctive order or mandamus to prosecute or appoint a special prosecu-
tor to pursue the charges. Following the burden shifting structure formulated in
Batson, the victim would plead a prima facie case of discriminatory intent by
demonstrating: (1) she was a member of a racial group singled out for dispa-
rate treatment in the rape prosecution area; (2) there was a substantial likeli-
hood that failure to prosecute was based on race; and (3) the process by which
failure to prosecute took place is discretionary and susceptible to abuse.
The first two prongs would be satisfied with sufficient statistics of histori-
cal disparities in the prosecution of rape cases in the jurisdiction. The third
prong would be easy to meet as there are generally no prosecutorial processes
and the known research demonstrates overt reliance of others' stereotypes and
prejudices in prosecutors' use of system outcome biases.30 8 The burden would
then shift to the prosecutor to produce race-neutral reasons for dismissal or
failure to charge. Because the system of prosecutorial discretion is so individu-
alized and standardless, it is likely that most prosecutors would have a difficult
time producing reasons that were not intertwined with improper race and gen-
der considerations. Ultimately, it would be up to the court to determine if the
proffered race-neutral reason was pretextual.30 9 Although a court might not
rule in favor of an individual victim, the case itself might be sufficient to shed
light on the continuing problem of racial disparities in sexual assault prosecu-
tion. That light might be sufficient for a prosecutor to institute improved case
charging procedures, or for communities to choose another person for the posi-
tion of prosecutor, or for a legislature to enact appropriate data reporting mea-
sures. Any of these results would stand as a victory for the cause of racial
justice.
CONCLUSION
Gendered racism in rape cases is a longstanding stain on the promises of
equality in the criminal justice system. Although the issue has been discussed,
researched, and litigated, very little has changed in the way that prosecutors
exercise their discretion over charging in rape cases. Although all information
indicates a devaluation of Black women's rape experiences, prosecutors con-
tinue to rely on non-legal reasons when making critical discretionary decisions.
308I wish to thank my colleague, Assistant Professor of Law Jessica Silbey, for her assis-
tance and suggestions regarding this litigation remedy.
309 See supra note 307 (describing the shifting burden requirements of a Batson challenge).
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Most significantly, prosecutors claim their use of discretion is governed by
hypothetical juror prejudices against demeanor of poor and minority victims.
This system outcome bias appears to be the primary entry point for the histori-
cal race based rape meta-narratives that maintain significant racial disparities in
rape prosecution. The elimination of that practice, together with additional pro-
cedures within prosecutors' offices, would greatly diminish the effect of bias in
the charging decision process. Additional legislative and litigation tools could
likewise be applied to the problem. Considering the intransient nature of the
race disparities in rape prosecutions, it is doubtful that these actions will lead to
equality overnight. However, failing to take these relatively small steps will
insure that rape prosecutions in this new century will be as tainted by racial
prejudice as those of the last.
